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On the second of August, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait,
setting off a chain of international events culminating in the
United Nations sanctioned attack upon Iraq by a number of
nations led by the United States. The purpose of this paper
is to consider one aspect of that armed conflict: the Iraqi
release of oil at the Sea Island Terminal and the igniting of
the Kuwaiti oil wells under both international environmental
law and the international law of armed conflict.- Relevant
sources from both these fields of international law will be
reviewed and an attempt then made to apply them to the Iraqi
oil "weapon".'
The basic thesis of this paper is that the Iraqi oil
weapon did violate certain portions of both fields of
international law, although not in the expansive manner that
some international lawyers have asserted. Specifically, the
oil weapon violated Iraq's duties as a party to the Kuwait
Regional Convention, and the general international law
principle of non-interference. Iraq also violated customary
international law as evidenced by the Hague IV Regulations.
It also failed to carry out its duties as a party to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. Options for enforcing the applicable law
are then reviewed, including a discussion of the historic
I
For the sake of convenient reference, both the oil
release and the oil fires will be referred to as "weapons".
The quotation marks are used to denote the conclusion later in
this paper that neither constitute legitimate weapons under
the law of armed conflict.
reparations mechanism developed by the United Nations Security
Council. This paper concludes with an appraisal of the
limitations for further developing environmental protections
1during armed conflicts.-.--....
A. Factual Background
Following the invasion of the State of Kuwait by Iraqi
forces on August 2, 1990, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq
threatened to pollute the Persian Gulf with oil 2 and to set
fire to Kuwait's oil wells3 should other nations attempt to
liberate Kuwait. Iraq was in effect holding the ecosystem of
the Persian Gulf region hostage just as Iraq had previously
held citizens of Western nations hostage as "human shields" at
Iraqi military facilities. Within a week after the start of
the U.S. led coalition air offensive, Iraq began to carry out
these threats.
1. The Sea Island Terminal Oil Spill
Three days after the Coalition air offensive commenced
against Iraq the first act of sabotage occurred in Kuwait
about a dozen miles south of Kuwait City at the Mina al Ahmadi
2 Lippman and Booth, Oil Spreading Off Kuwait Poses
Ecological Disaster, Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 1991, at A13.
3
Murphy, Iraqis Said to Set Oil Installations Ablaze,
Wash. Post, Feb. 23, 1991, at A1O.
2
port facility. Around January 19, 1991, the Iraqis pumped
Iraqi crude oil from five tankers located at the port through
undersea pipes and out into the Persian Gulf from the Sea
Island Terminal.4  The terminal was located eight miles off
the Kuwaiti coast, and was normally used to load super tankers
with oil. The five tankers from which the oil was pumped were
said to contain a total of three million barrels of oil.
5
Besides being connected to the oil tanker piers, Sea
Island Terminal was also linked by pipeline to oil storage
facilities at Mina al Ahmadi as well as to oil fields further
inland. Shortly after emptying the tankers, the Iraqis
committed their second act of sabotage and opened up the taps
at Sea Island, permitting the oil from the storage tanks and
fields to flow directly into the Gulf. While the Sea Island
Terminal was reported to have the capability of pumping
100,000 barrels an hour, it was not clear how much was
6
actually being released. The size of the combined spill was
4
Balz, U.S.. Allies Press Bombing Against Forces in
Kuwai Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1991, at A24. (Tests on the
resulting oil slick conducted by Saudi Aramco on January 30
confirmed the source of the oil at the southern edge of the
slick to be Iraqi oil fields and that the oil had been in the
water for at least eleven days. Mr. Jerry Gaines, the
economic officer at the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia suggested
that these facts were evidence that Iraq intended from the
beginning of the war to use oil as a weapon.)
5
Atkinson and Hoffman, General Hopeful Torrent Into
Gulf Has Been Reduced, Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 1991, at Al.
66 Lippman and Booth, gupra note 2 at A13.
Besides the obvious problem of lack of access to the
facility in order to assess the amount spilled, the difficulty
involved in quantifying the size of the spill is further
3
therefore never precisely determined, though it was eventually
estimated at between 500,000 and three million barrels of
oil.
7
Despite having threatened to spill oil in the Gulf, Iraq
initially denied actually doing so, and instead blamed the
multiplied by contradictory accounts in the press. While the
Washington Post reported the Pentagon as saying the five
tankers contained three million barrels of oil, Newsweek
reported this quantity as three million qallons of oil.
Similarly, while the Washington Post reported the pumping
capacity of Sea Island Terminal as 100,000 barrels an hour,
Newsweek reported it as 100,000 barrels a day. See Begley,
etc., Saddam's Ecoterror, Newsweek, Feb. 4, 1991, at 36.
After the U.S. cut off the source of the spill, Saudi
officials estimated the slick contained up to eleven million
barrels of oil and measured some 60 miles long and 20 miles
wide. See Atkinson and Hoffman, Bush Asks U.S. to Bear
'Burden of Leadership': Superpowers Tell Iraq It Can End War
In Gulf, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1991 at A24.
That estimate would have made the spill the largest in
history, eclipsing Mexico's Ixtoc offshore well spill of 4.3
million barrels and the U.S.'s Exxon Valdez spill of 260,000
barrels. The eventual Saudi Government reassessment downward
suggested that the Sea Island Terminal spill was roughly two
to twelve times the size of the Exxon Valdez spill. American
oil experts were surprised and perplexed by the subsequent
Saudi figures. See Atkinson and Devroy, Soviet Proposal Falls
Well Short. Bush Says, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1991 at Al.
The revision could indicate that the Saudi estimates
were being manipulated for political purposes. An unnamed
senior diplomat was reported as saying that the Saudis may
have minimized the estimates out of concern that they were
unable to fund clean-up efforts. See Branigan, War Hampers
Effort to Clean Up Huae Gulf Oil Spill, Wash. Post, Feb.
17,1991 at A41.
The revision may also indicate an intentional
inflation of the initial estimates by Coalition nations in
order to more starkly portray Saddam Hussein as an "eco-
terrorist". 5&g Wheelright, My Turn: MuzzlinQ Science,
Newsweek, Apr. 22, 1991 at 10.
4
Americans for the spill in a complaint to the United Nations.
8
In a later interview, President Saddam Hussein neither
admitted nor denied that this oil spill had been deliberate.
However, he did claim that his field commanders would be
justified in using oil as a technique of self-defense in
fighting the United States.
9
8 Iraq charged that the spill was caused when U.S.
aircraft bombed two Iraqi oil tankers on January 22. Atkinson
and Balz, Iraa Dumpina Flood of Oil into Gulf. U.S. Says: More
Scud Missiles Strike Israel, Saudi Arabia, Wash. Post, Jan.
26, 1991, at Al.
While U.S. officials acknowledged this attack took
place, they claimed that only a small slick of refined
petroleum resulted from damaging the tankers. The subsequent
size and location of the slick seemed to bear out the American
claim.
Nonetheless, there were in fact numerous sources of
oil pollution in the Gulf during the war, though only the Sea
Island Terminal spill was intentional. For example, a leak
occurred from the Mina al Bakr oil terminal located in Iraq at
the north end of the Gulf. Although the Coalition closely
studied the terminal for signs of an intentional release, the
terminal's location near the site of the U.S. air attack on
the Iraqi tankers made it possible that the release was the
result of collateral damage caused in the attack. See
Atkinson and Gellman, Irag Trying to Shelter Jets in Iran,
Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1991, at A13.
At the same time, there were reports of oil pollution
coming from several other sources, including a tank farm in
Khafji, Saudi Arabia and a leaking wellhead at the Kafji oil
fields. See Branigan, su note 7 at Al.
A month after the Sea Island Terminal spill, the
Saudi Environmental Agency estimated that twenty to thirty
percent of oil spillage in the Gulf had resulted from attacks
by Coalition forces on land and naval targets along the
Kuwaiti coast. See Atkinson and Devroy, supra note 7 at Al.
9
. Arnett, Account of Saddam Interview, Wash. Post, Jan.
29, 1991, at A10.
The actual intent of the Iraqis with regard to the
Sea Island Terminal spill became clear as the slick from the
terminal grew larger each day. The Iraqis, who of course
controlled the Mina al Ahmadi port facility and the connected
Sea Island Terminal, took no action to stop the flow.
Although the slick was accidentally set on fire
5
Whatever the precise size of the Sea Island Terminal
spill, environmentalists were in agreement that it was among
the largest ever and ranked as a major ecological disaster.
10
Prior to the start of the war, the Gulf had supported a
vigorous and relatively healthy ecosystem despite having been
the most oil-polluted body of water in the world.11 The Sea
Island Terminal spill will probably change that. The multi-
million dollar Saudi Arabi-an shrimp and fishing industry was
12
apparently wiped out by the spill. Coral reefs and rare
mangrove stands, sea grass beds, sea turtles and marine
mammals as well as a large number of migratory birds have been
January 25 during an engagement between U.S. and Iraqi naval
forces, it continued to grow rapidly. Atkinson and Hoffman,
s note 4 at Al.
On its own initiative, the U.S. was able to end the
release of the oil from the Sea Island Terminal by severing
the petroleum pipeline complexes feeding the Terminal in a
precision bombing air attack on January 27. Thus, far from
being the cause of the large spill, the U.S. was actually
responsible for quickly ending the release.
10 The impact of the spill was significantly magnified
by the fact that the Persian Gulf ecosystem is among the most
fragile in the world. The Gulf is both relatively shallow (an
average of 110 feet deep) and closed (it is flushed only by
exchanging waters with the Indian Ocean). Because of this it
takes the Gulf 200 years to complete a single flushing cycle.
By contrast, the Exxon Valdez spill occurred in Prince William
Sound, which flushes completely every few days. Begley,
etc., suVr note 6, at 38.
IdS, at 38. (At the cornerstone of that ecosystem
are rich sea grass beds, which will be contaminated by the
tarry mass of sinking oil. The beds contain nurseries for
shrimp, oysters and fish.)
12 Lippman, Gulf War Leaves Environment Severely
Wounded, Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 1991, at Al.
6
extensively injured.13  A number of wildlife were also
threatened. Seven thousand rare dugong live in the Gulf.
14
Also living in the Gulf and already listed as endangered
species are the Green and Hawksbill sea turtles. Birds have
been the most visible of nature's victims, with thousands
believed to have died. The diving species were particularly
hard hit.
15
2. The Destruction of Kuwaiti Oil Wells and Facilities
Like the release of oil in the Gulf, the torching of
Kuwaiti oil wells and destruction of oil facilities had been
preceded by repeated threats from Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein to blow them up if his forces in Kuwait were attacked.
Shortly after the August invasion, Iraqi Army engineers
13 Weisskopf, Oil Fire Pollution Assessed, Wash. Post,
Apr. 4, 1991 at A25.
14 Branigan, su ra note 7.
Sometimes known as a sea cow, the dugong is related
to Florida's manatee. The dugong is a large aquatic mammal
which averages 10 to 13 feet in length. A herbivore, the
dugong tends to live in groups and is totally aquatic but
requires frequent brief visits to the surface in order to
breath. See G. Bertram and C. Bertram, Sirenia (duaong.
manatees), The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia
(1989).
15 Branigan, supra note 7 at A41. (Most significant
among the diving species were the common and Socotra cormorant
and the black-necked and great crested grebe. Several million
migratory birds also winter in the Gulf beginning in late
February. When birds come in contact with oil, they lose
their buoyancy as well as their insulation from cold weather.
As they attempt to remove the oil by preening, they ingest tar
balls of oil, feathers and sand in the process.)
7
prepared to make good on the threat by systematically planting
mines and explosives at most Kuwaiti oil wells, storage tanks,
tanker-loading facilities and refineries.1
6
The first Iraqi sabotage to the oil wells also coincided
with the opening of the spigots at Sea Island Terminal and the
commencement of the coalition air campaign (beginning on
January 16, 1991). On that occasion, the Icaqis set fire to
17
dozens of welis in the Wafra field in southern Kuwait. At
about the same time, Iraqi Army corps commanders received
orders from Baghdad to destroy the remaining Kuwaiti oil
18
fields in the event of a ground war.
Then, around February 20, 1991, with the ground war still
several days away, Baghdad ordered the rest of Kuwait's 1,080
high pressure wellheads and its oil facilities destroyed. By
Sunday, 24 February, when the ground offensive commenced, Iraq
had already set ablaze 500 of the wells. 19 By the time the
coalition had routed the Iraqis from Kuwait, the Iraqis had
succeeded in creating damage of tremendous proportions: more
than 800 wellheads were rendered inoperable, including 535 set
ablaze; about half of Kuwait's 26 petroleum gathering centers
16 Schwartz, etc., Blasting Down to the Wire, Newsweek,
Mar. 4, 1991, at 38.
17 Begley and Hager, Will Sabotage Cancel Springtime?,
Newsweek, Feb. 4, 1991, at 39.
is Atkinson and Claiborne, Allies Surround Republican
Guard. Say Crippled Iraq Is Near Defeat, Wash. Post, Feb. 27,
1991, at Al.
19 Schwartz, etc., supra note 16.
8
were damaged; all of its surface oil-storage facilities were
destroyed; all booster stations along the vast Kuwaiti oil-
pipeline network were destroyed; $80 million in spare parts
for oil producing equipment and oil industry support
facilities were damaged or destroyed; and some damage to oil
refineries was sustained.
20
While the costs21 imposed by the Iraqi sabotage to the
oil wells and facilities were huge, the environmental damage
had a similar potential. Unlike the damage from the Sea
Island Terminal spill, which was centered on fish and
wildlife, the oil fire damage is expected to more directly
impact human health.22 To date, brisk winds have carried the
20 Claiborne, Kuwaitis Lift Estimates of Oil Damage,
Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 1991, at Al. (The Iraqis had actually set
demolition charges at nearly every oil well, but some had
failed to detonate.)
21 Id., at Al. (Huge costs will be involved in
replacing the facilities and in putting out the 535 oil well
fires. In addition, preliminary estimates were that the fires
were consuming six million barrels of oil per day. With a
market price of $20 a barrel, this meant a loss of $120
million a day in revenue. Estimates on how long it would take
to put out the fires varied from six months to five years.)
22 Data collected in Kuwait during the summer of 1991
indicated the presence of PM-10 pollution at levels four to
ten times the levels present in the Los Angeles air basin.
PM-10 is the scientific term used to describe air particles
less than 10 microns in size. The danger to human health from
such particles lies in their ability to enter the lung through
the normal breathing process. PM-10 particulates can trigger
asthma attacks and cause immediate harm to people with other
respiratory problems. They are also dangerous on a long-term
basis to the general population as a whole, since they act as
carriers of other chemical pollutants into the lung such as
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, some of which can cause
cancer. Bee Parrish, The Spoils of War; A Report on the Eco-
Disaster in the Persian Gulf, L.A. Times, June 23, 1991, at
9
air pollutants away, preventing significant short-term illness
to people in the area. Still, local residents and U.S. troops
in Kuwait City have complained of headaches and eye
irritation. A study by the U.S. E.P.A. showed that for brief
periods, particularly in the vicinity of the fires, pollution
levels exceeded U.S. air quality standards over 400 times.
23
Health risks could increase dramatically with the onset of the
temperature inversions which occur in Kuwait during the summer
months. An inversion can trap the toxic gases from the wells,
causing a dangerous smog that could kill people and animals.
24
A second pollution problem related to the high sulfur
dioxide emissions from the oil well fires is acid rain and
sulfates. The sulfur dioxide released into the atmosphere can
return to the ground either combined with water vapor to form
sulfuric acid or be deposited as sulfates. Winds have carried
these emissions from the Kuwaiti oil wells as far east as
India. The deposited sulfur-laden rain and particles damage
25
plants (including crops), forests and soil resources.
Thirdly, the burning oil releases particulates which
absorb or adsorb other cancer-causing compounds. The
Magazine, p. 16.
23 Weisskopf, supra note 13 at A25.
242 Leerhsen, etc., Hellfighters to the Rescue, Newsweek,
Mar. 25, 1991 at 30.
252 Claiborne, supra note 20. See also R. Dasmann,
Conservation of Natural Resources, The New Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Macropaedia, (1989).
10
particulates then enter the body through the air, water or
food.26 The cancer threat normally takes years of exposure
to become significant. The long-term threat to countries in
the region in this regard will largely turn on the extent of
27
water and food contamination.
More speculative, was the fear of damage on a global
scale from the impact the soot produced might have on climate
over a six to twelve month period. If soot rises high enough,
it could alter the way the sun's energy is absorbed.
28
Fortunately, so far the smoke from the oil fires has remained
below the cloud cover where it is less likely to block the
29
sun.
Part One: International Environmental Law Analysis
International environmental law draws from all the
sources traditionally cited by commentators as providing rules
262 Weisskopf, supra note 13 at A26. See also A. Reitze,
The Health Effects of Air Pollution (1991).
27 Lippman, supra note 12 at All.
28 Begley and Hager, supra note 17. (Normally, the
ground soaks up heat and creates warm air which in turn rises
and creates turbulence which drives the weather. But should
the soot rise three to five miles up, it could absorb the
solar energy instead, stifling atmospheric circulation. With
less solar energy reaching the ground, temperatures would cool
and that could result in an interruption of the summer monsoon
season in Asia, on which many people depend for food
production. It could also bring frost in spring, killing
crops elsewhere.)
29 Leerhsen, etc., supra note 24.
11
of public international law. As laid out in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, these sources
are international conventions, international custom and the
30
general principles of law. This paper will analyze the
Terminal Island oil spill and the oil well fires by first
considering the relevant portions of each of these sources
related to international environmental law. As will be
developed, only conventional law provides a binding rule under
which the Iraqi conduct can be considered illegal.
II. Relevant Conventional International Environmental Law
A. Trans-Boundary Air Pollution
The spewing of one to two million tons of carbon dioxide
as well as other as of yet undefined pollutants daily into
the air from the oil fires set by the Iraqis 31 obviously
raises the issue of whether there are international
conventions which regulate trans-boundary air pollution. Yet
30 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art.
38, para. 1(b).
While Art. 38 also includes "judicial decisions" and
"the teachings of highly qualified publicists", these are to
be "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law".
As such, most commentators view this last catagory as not a
source of law but only as evidence that a given norm has
become a legally binding rule of general application. See I.
Brownlie, PrinciDles of Public International Law 1-4 (3d. ed.
1979).
31 Booth, Fires Not a Threat to Global Climate. Federal
SuyFn, Wash. Post, June 25, 1991 at A3.
12
little agreement, to date, has been achieved through multi-
lateral treaties regarding the control of this pollutant.
Emphasis has so far been largely limited to exchanging
information, conducting research and agreeing to consult
32
concerning the problem. There were therefore no global
treaties either open for signature or in force in 1991 which
applied directly to the air pollution resulting from the
Kuwaiti oil well fires.
33
B. Marine Pollution
Iraq has been noticeably absent from the large list of
coastal and maritime nations which have joined in conventions
seeking to limit marine pollution caused by discharging and
dumping oil from vessels and platforms. Since after World War
I, an increasing number of nations have been engaged in a
periodic dialogue to develop treaties limiting oil discharge
32 See Convention on Long-Range Trans-boundary Air
Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442 reprinted in
International Environmental Reporter Reference File 21:3001.
(This essentially European regional agreement entered into
force in 1983 with 32 countries presently party to it. Two
protocols to the Convention were concluded in 1985. The
protocols commit the parties to reducing sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen emissions. Sponsored by the UN Economic Commission
for Europe, the Convention and its protocols have only been
signed by North American and European industrialized nations.)
Air pollution is nonetheless a significant
contributor to marine pollution. As will be discussed in the
next section, this link has been the subject of a treaty
relevant to the Iraqi oil "weapon".)
13
from vessels. 3 This dialogue has resulted in four treaties
in which the parties agreed to standards for limiting oil
pollution from vessels and platforms: the OILPOL Convention
(1954)35, the London Dumping Convention (1972) 36, the MARPOL
J. Kindt, 1 Marine Pollution and the Law of the Sea
256 (1986).
The U.S. and later the League of Nations initiated
this effort, with the first attempt culminating in a 1926
international conference at which a draft agreement was
produced but subsequently never ratified.
International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S.
4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3; Amendments: Mar. 11, 1962, 17 U.S.T.
1523, T.I.A.S. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332; Oct. 21, 1969, 29
U.S.T. 1205, T.I.A.S. 8505 [Hereinafter OILPOL].
OILPOL prohibits the discharge of oil in certain
coastal areas by most classes of larger ships, including oil
tankers over 150 tons. Under the 1954 version, oil discharge
was prohibited within certain designated zones, covering most
but not all coastal areas out to 50 nautical miles. These
zones included the sea area off the Kuwaiti coast. OILPOL,
Annex A.
Subsequent amendments in 1962 and 1969 expanded the
prohibited zones, eventually applying the oil discharge
restrictions contained in the 1954 treaty to all ocean areas.
Goldie, International Maritime Environmental Law Today, in Who
Protects the Oceans? 80 (J.L. Hargrove, ed. 1975).
While the Convention does contain provisions
permitting discharge of small amounts of oil from machinery
space bilges and de-ballasting (Art. III(c)), it otherwise
prohibits any discharge or escape of oil from oil tankers
either intentionally, accidentally or through routine
operations. Art. I(1).
Since approximately 90% of all oil discharged into
the oceans from vessels comes from deliberate acts such as de-
ballasting and tank washing, these were the activities
primarily affected by OILPOL. See C. Okidi, Reaional Control
of Ocean Pollution: Legal and Institutional Problems and
Prospects 29 (1978).
OILPOL entered into force in 1958, and by 1990, 69
nations had become parties to at least the basic treaty. As
noted, Iraq is not a party to OILPOL.
363 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 26 U.S.T. 2403,
T.I.A.S. 8165, 11 I.L.M. 1294 [Hereinafter London Dumping
14
Convention (1973) 37, and the MARPOL Protocol (1978).38
Convention].
The London Dumping Convention advanced international
efforts to control marine pollution by expanding the types of
pollution from vessels to be regulated. The convention limits
the deliberate dumping at sea of wastes and other matter by
vessels, aircraft or platforms when these wastes and other
matter are being transported by or to the vessels, aircraft or
platforms for the purpose of disposal. The Convention
therefore does not seek to limit any disposal at sea of wastes
or other matter that is incidental or derived from the normal
operations of a vessel, aircraft or platform. Art. III(1).
The Convention requires parties to prohibit such
dumping in all marine waters except internal waters. Art.
111(3).
The Convention also categorizes wastes and matter,
permitting the dumping of certain types pollutants through a
permit system, while placing an absolute prohibition on the
dumping of others. Among the substances on which there is a
total ban is crude oil. Art. IV(1)(a) and Annex 1(5).
The London Dumping Convention entered into force in
1975, and by 1990, 64 nations had become parties to it. Iraq
was not a party to the Convention.
37
International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution From Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, I.M.C.O. Doc.
MP/CONF/WP.35 (Nov. 2, 1973) reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319
[Hereinafter MARPOLI.
The MARPOL Convention sought to expand the
restrictions on vessel-source pollution (including pollution
incidental to normal operations) initiated by the OILPOL
Convention. Specifically, restrictions are applied to
platforms as well as vessels, and cover not only petroleum in
any form but also a long enumerated list of certain "noxious
liquid substances in bulk". Art. 2(4), Annex I (Reg.1(1) and
9), Annex II (App.2).
Parties are invited but not required to also adopt
additional restrictions on certain other enumerated pollutants
contained in three additional Annexes. Annexes III-V.
Annex I sets out regulations for the prevention of
pollution by oil. While this Annex contains provisions on
ship design, required inspections, shore oil reception
facilities and required records, most pertinent to this paper
are the restrictions on discharge of oil overboard by oil
tankers. It prohibits the discharge of any oil from tankers
within either 12 or 50 nautical miles of land (depending on
vessel size), or when located within special areas. Annex
I(Reg.9(1). The "special areas" are semi-enclosed seas where
pollution is a particular problem and specifically include the
Persian Gulf. Annex I (Reg. 10(1)(e)).
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Since Iraq is not a party to any of these conventions,
further discussion of them will be deferred to considering
their value as evidencing customary law in the next section.
In 1979, Iraq did, however, break with its history of
non-participation to become a party to a convention placing
limits on maritime oil pollution with the Gulf. This
convention clearly established Iraqi liability for violating
international environmental law.
Because of technical problems related to Annex II
and reluctance by maritime states in adopting certain
inspection and oil tanker design requirements contained in
Annex I, only three states have ratified the MARPOL
Convention. It has therefore not entered into force in its
unamended version. See M. Bowman and D. Harris, Multilateral
Treaties- Index and Current Status 158 (Supp. 1990).
Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships,
T.I.A.S. 10009, reprinted in International Environment
Reporter Reference File, 21:2381.
The MARPOL Protocol deferred application of Annex II
of the basic Convention and also made some modifications to
the Annex I inspection and oil tanker design requirements.
Significantly, the oil discharge restrictions contained in
Annex I and pertinent to this paper were left unchanged. See
MARPOL Protocol Annex. (No change to Regulation 9.)
Ratification of the MARPOL Protocol results in
automatic acceptance of the MARPOL Convention as modified.
Art. I(b).
For those nations which had previously become
parties to OILPOL but which subsequently became parties to
either MARPOL or the 1978 Protocol, OILPOL is superseded. See
MARPOL Convention, s note 37, Art. 9(1).
As amended by the MARPOL Protocol, the MARPOL
Convention (including Annex I) entered into force in 1983 and
as of 1990, 57 nations had become parties to it. Iraq was not
a party to either MARPOL or the 1978 Protocol.
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1. Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the
ProtectioA of the Marine Environment from
Pollution
The Kuwait Regional Convention entered into force in
1979, and all eight coastal nations of the Persian Gulf
including Iraq have signed it. It was developed through the
United Nations Environment Program Regional Seas Program,
which had recognized the Persian Gulf as a "concentrated area"
requiring special attention to control pollution. The
geographical coverage of the Convention includes the entire
Gulf. 4 Central to the issue of the illegality of the Iraqi
Sea Island Terminal spill and oil well fires are the articles
which commit the parties to taking "all appropriate measures
to prevent, abate and combat pollution in the (Persian Gulf)
caused by: ... dumping of wastes and other matter from ships
and aircraft1 ...; ... intentional or accidental di3charges
42from ships ... and "...discharges from land reaching the
(Persian Gulf) whether water-borne, air-borne, or directly
from the Coast including out-falls and pipelines..." 43
39
Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the
Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, Apr. 24,
1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133 [Hereinafter Kuwait Regional
Convention].
40 Id., Art. II. See also Amin, CleaninQ Up Pollution
and Wrecks in the Gulf, Vol. 30 No. 10 Middle East Executive
Reports 21 (1988).
41 Kuwait Regional Convention, supra note 39 at Art. V.




The pumping of oil from the five tankers at Mina al Ahmadi
into the Persian Gulf through Sea Island Terminal plainly
violated Iraq's duty to prevent pollution of the Gulf from
intentional discharge and dumping from ships. Iraq breached
its duty to prevent pollution from land from reaching the Gulf
when it released crude oil from storage facilities and oil
fields through Sea Island Terminal. Finally, the Iraqi
sabotage of Kuwait's oil wells, resulting in 535 oil well
fires, violated its duty to prevent air-borne discharges of
pollutants from reaching the Gulf. In this regard, as Article
VI recognized, air pollution is a significant contributor to
pollution in water.
44
The parties are also committed to ensuring compliance in
the Gulf with "applicable international rules" relating to
control of discharges of pollution from ships and the dumping
of wastes from ships and aircraft.45  This reference to
"applicable international rules" is further clarified in the
Action Plan which was concluded by the parties during the same
month as the Kuwait Regional Convention.46  Included within
the Plan is an appeal by the Parties for each to ratify and
Shabecoff, Acid Rain Called Peril to Sea Life on
Atlantic Coast, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1988 at 6.
45
Kuwait Regional Convention sua note 39 at Art. IV
and Art. V.
464 Action Plan for the Protection and Development of the
Marine Environment and the Coastal Areas of Bahrain, Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates, Apr. 23, 1978, reprinted in International
Environment Reporter Reference File, 21:2701.
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implement relevant international conventions controlling
pollution from ships, particularly OILPOL, MARPOL, and the
1978 MARPOL Protocol.47 Thus, while the Convention did not
incorporate these treaties, it required the Parties to enforce
compliance with the standards within them.
In the event of a dispute among the parties concerning
the interpretation or application of the treaty, settlement is
first to be sought through negotiation or other peaceful
means. If agreement is not reached, the dispute is to be
submitted to a Judicial Committee for the Settlement of
48
Disputes. The Judicial Committee is a part of the
organization established to administer the programs by the
Convention.
49
III. The Absence of Relevant Customary International
Environmental Law
Since marine pollution has overtime been the most
developed field in international environmental law, it is
47
Id at 21:2703, no.25.
484 Kuwait Regional Convention, supra note 39 at Art. XXV.
49
The Regional Organization for the Protection of the
Marine Environment consists of three organs: a Council
composed of the parties; a Secretariat; and the Judicial
Commission. The composition, terms of reference and rules of
procedure of the Judicial Commission was to have been
established at the first meeting of the Council. Ironically,
the Organization was headquartered in Kuwait, which had taken
the lead in proposing the Convention. See Kuwait Regional
Convention, supra note 39 at Art. XVI.
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worth considering whether any customary law has emerged as a
result of the string of agreements signed in the 36-year
period preceding the 1991 Persian Gulf War. This section
therefore poses two questions for analysis. First, assuming
Iraq were a party to any of the four treaties placing
restrictions on oil pollution from vessels or platforms (The
OILPOL Convention, the London Dumping Convention, the MARPOL
Convention and the MARPOL Protocol), would Iraq have violated
those restrictions by the oil release at Sea Island Terminal?
Second, if so, then do these treaties give rise to rules of
customary international law that would bind Iraq nonetheless?
As will be developed, the Sea Island Terminal spill can be
said to have violated either the vessel-source pollution
restrictions in the MARPOL Protocol or the dumping restriction
in the London Dumping Convention. However, since neither of
these treaties has yet to spawn an international customary
norm, they contain no law binding upon Iraq.
A. Are There Oil Pollution Treaty Restrictions Which
Would Apply?
1. The OILPOL Convention5
The oil released from the man-made Sea Island Terminal
platform, located eight miles off the Kuwaiti coast, had two
Infra note 35.
20
sources: Five oil tankers berthed in a Kuwaiti port, and oil
stored at the port as well as oil fields further inland.
Since OILPOL only restricts the discharge of oil from ships
51
(and not oil platforms) application of the OILPOL
restrictions would initially be limited to the oil pumped from
the five tankers. As to oil tankers, OILPOL (in all its
versions) prohibits discharge of oil within specified
52
prohibited zones along certain coastal areas. Included
within the prohibited zones was the sea area off the Kuwaiti
coast, including the Sea Island Terminal.
53
While OILPOL's prohibition would therefore seem to apply
to the act of pumping oil from the tankers out into the Gulf,
there are two significant exceptions within the treaty which
limit its application. First, OILPOL does not apply to ships
used as naval auxiliaries.54  These are generally considered
to be vessels, other than warships, that are owned by or under
the exclusive control of the armed forces of a nation and used
only on government non-commercial service.55  While details
51 OILPOL, supr note 35 unamended at Art. II, and in
its 1962 and 1969 amended versions at Art. I(1).
52. Jd at Art. III. (Some allowance was made for "oily
mixture" with a parts per million cap on oil content but that
allowance would not apply to undiluted crude oil.)
53 Infra note 35.
54
OILPOL, s note 35 at Art. II.
55 Dept. of the Navy, Annotated Supplement to the
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations 2-4 (1989)
[Hereinafter Law of Naval Operations].
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concerning the nationality and commercial character of the
five tankers are not publicly available, an argument can be
made that the tankers fell under the exclusive control cf the
Iraqi armed forces at the time of the oil release.
Secondly, in case of war or other hostilities, the
Convention permits a party to unilaterally suspend the
application of the Convention to ships registered within its
56
territory. This exception is more significant than the
first since it signals that the oil pollution restrictions
were only optional in an ar.hed conflict. Had Iraq been a
party to OILPOL, it could easily have given notice of
suspension and avoided any responsibility under the Treaty for
the subsequent spill. Given these limitations, OILPOL would
not have restricted the Iraqi act in releasing oil at Sea
Island Terminal had Iraq been a party to it.
2. The MARPOL Conventipn as Amended by
the MARPOL Protocol
Intended as a successor agreement to OILPOL58 , the MARPOL
Convention, as amended by the MARPOL Protocol, likewise
prohibited the discharge of oil into certain marine waters
56 OILPOL, supra note 35 at Art. XIX.
57
Infra notes 37 and 38.
Cycon, Calmina Troubled Waters: The Developina
International Reaime to Control Operational Pollution, 13 J.
Mar. Law & Com. 35,41 (1981).
22
59
designated as "special areas". Under the Protocol, all of
the Gulf was designated as a "special area" and therefore
discharge of oil therein by large ships is prohibited.6
Unlike OILPOL, which applied restrictions only to sea-going
vessels, the MARPOL Protocol limitations applied to fixed
platforms as well. 61 Therefore, all of the oil released at
Sea Island Terminal violated the MARPOL Protocol restrictions
regardless of whether its source was a tanker or a facility
ashore. 62
59
MARPOL Convention, supra note 37 at Annex I (Regs.
9 & 10).
For oil tankers, the prohibition applies within 50
nautical miles from the nearest land and in other designated
"special areas". For ships other than oil tankers and
weighing more than 400 tons gross tonnage, the prohibition
applies within 12 nautical miles from the nearest land and
within the designated "special areas". Since the Convention
defines "ship" to include fixed platforms, this latter
catagory presumably applies to platforms as well.
6060 Id.
61 61 Id. at Art. 2(4).
62 Article 2 of the MARPOL Convention defines
"discharge" to mean any release of harmful substances
(elsewhere defined as oil and the other enumerated pollutants)
"howsoever caused from a ship". However, Article 2 goes on to
exclude from the definition of "discharge" any release
constituting dumping under the London Dumping Convention.
This suggests that the Sea Island Terminal spill can be a
violation of either the MARPOL Protocol or the London Dumping
Convention but not both.
The distinction between the two treaties in regard
to the Sea Island Terminal spill turns on the purpose of the
Iraqis. The London Dumping Convention defines "dumping" as
"any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter."
Art. III(1). If the Iraqi purpose in releasing the oil into
the Gulf was vengeance, by destroying valuable property of the
Kuwaiti state, then Iraq intended to dispose of the oil.
However, if the Iraqi purpose was to use the oil as a weapon
to ward off an amphibious assault or shut down the Saudi
23
The argument that the MARPOL Protocol applies to Iraq's
oil spill is strengthened by the noticeable absence of a war
63
clause such as had been provided for in OILPOL. The
omission of a war clause in a treaty designated as a successor
to OILPOL is evidence that the parties intended the release
restrictions within the MARPOL Protocol to apply in wartime
and during hostilities as well as in peacetime.
The Protocol does contain an exemption from the
application of its pollution restrictions for naval
64
auxiliaries. However, the exemption is followed by an
agreement that warships and naval auxiliaries must "act in a
manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable,
with the present Convention."'65 There is therefore some room
for argument that this qualifying language would strip the oil
tankers berthed at Mina al Ahmadi of the exemption they might
otherwise qualify, even if they were viewed as naval
desalinization plants, then disposal of the oil was not their
intent (though still the collateral effect) and hence the
MARPOL Protocol rather than the London Dumping Convention
would apply.
63 'The MARPOL Protocol does provide an exemption from
liability for oil discharges resulting from damage to a ship
or its equiDment provided all reasonable precautions are taken
to minimize the discharge and provided that the owner or
master acted neither recklessly or with intent to cause
damage. MARPOL Convention, supr note 37, Annex I (Reg.1l).
The terms of this exception would therefore clearly not apply
to the Sea Island Terminal release.
64 I6d. at Art. 3(3).
65
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auxilliaries, since the release of the oil into the Gulf was
66
both unreasonable and impractical. It should also be
remembered that the MARPOL Protocol also applies to fixed
platforms, for which the naval auxiliary exception would
67
presumably not apply. The Sea Island Terminal spill would
then fall outside the naval auxiliary exception. Had Iraq
been a party to the MARPOL Protocol, the oil release at Sea
Island Terminal would have violated the prohibition against
the discharging of oil by large vessels and fixed platforms in
the Gulf (one of the specially designated marine areas).
3. The London Dumping Convention
68
Included within the provisions of the London Dumping
Convention is an absolute prohibition on the disposal of crude
oil in marine waters (except internal waters) from vessels and
69
fixed platforms. Assuming the Iraqi purpose was to
66 The practicality of the oil release as a weapon is
discussed infra at section VII (E) (2), p. 70.
67 It is questionable whether or not the term "naval
auxiliary" could be applied to a fixed platform as well as a
sea-going vessel. Given the expanded definition of "ship" in
the Protocol to include fixed platforms, it perhaps could be
argued that "naval auxiliary" also includes such installations
if subject to the same defining criteria as ocean-going
vessels. Certainly fixed platforms have an extensive history
of military use such as sites for radar and anti-aircraft
guns.
Infra note 36.
69 69 . at Art. IV(l), Art. VII, Annex I.
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vengefully render useless the crude oil released into the
Kuwaiti territorial sea from Sea Island Terminal, then the act
constituted a "disposal" of the crude oil, which violated the
enumerated prohibition in the London Dumping Convention.
Like the MARPOL Protocol, the London Dumping Convention
contains no war clause, signalling an intention to apply the
prohibition against dumping of crude oil during times of war
and hostilities as well as in peacetime. The Convention does
provide an exemption for naval auxiliaries under which the
70
tankers at Mina al Ahmadi might qualify. However, unlike
the MARPOL Protocol, the London Dumping Convention defines
71
vessels as a distinct catagory from fixed platforms. The
naval auxiliary exemption could therefore not apply to the Sea
Island Terminal. Additionally, as to the Iraqi tankers, the
exemption is further qualified by the statement that "...each
Party shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures
that such vessels and aircraft owned and operated by it act in
a manner consistent with the object and purpose of this
Convention..." 72 As with the amended MARPOL Convention then,
there is some room to argue that even if the tankers
70 Article VII(4) states in part: "This Convention
shall not apply to those vessels and aircraft entitled to
sovereign immunity under international law." Id.
Both warships and naval auxiliaries are entitled to
sovereign immunity. See Law of Naval Operations, su ra note
55 at 2-4.
71
. London Dumping Convention, sulra note 36 at Art.
111(2).
727 Id. at Art. VII(4).
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constituted naval auxiliaries, they were required to act
consistently with the prohibition against disposal of oil in
the Gulf.
In conclusion, had Iraq been a Party to the London
Dumping Convention, the Sea Island Terminal oil release would
have violated the Convention's rule against the disposal of
crude oil in marine waters outside internal waters of a state
by large vessels and fixed platforms.
B. Do These Conventions Contain Rules of Customary
International Law?
Since the MARPOL Protocol and the London Dumping
Convention contain certain rules of positive international law
which would have made the use of Iraq's oil "weapon" illegal,
had Iraq been a party to those Conventions, have these rules
become customary law and therefore binding upon Iraq despite
its non-participation in the treaties?
That it is possible for certain rules in treaties to
create norms of customary international law has been
recognized explicitly by the International Court of Justice in
the North Sea Island Continental Shelf Cases and to a lesser
73extent in other opinions. This is so because a treaty not
A. D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International
La 113-121 (1971).
The Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
considered the contention by Denmark and the Netherlands that
Article 6 of the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention had
spawned a rule of customary international law as a result of
27
only creates law which is binding upon the parties to it, but
it also has the potential for evidencing the general practice
of states in determining .whether a given rule of customary
74
international law has developed. General state practice
(also referred to as usage) and opinio iuris are the two basic
the signing of the convention as well as from other subsequent
state practice. The Court said:
71. In so far as this contention is based on
the view that Article 6 of the Convention has
had the influence, and has produced the
effect, described, it clearly involves
treating that Article as a norm-creating
provision which has constituted the foundation
of, or has generated a rule which, while only
conventional or contractual in its origin, has
since passed into the general corpus of
international law, and is now accepted as such
by the oDinio jiJ.ri, so as to have become
binding even for countries which have never,
and do not, become parties to the Convention.
There is no doubt that this process is a
perfectly possible one and does from time to
time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the
recognized methods by which new rules of
customary internaLiun*al law may be formed. At
the same time this result is not lightly to be
regarded as having been attained.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969
I.C.J. Rep. 4 at para. 71[Hereinafter N.Sea
Cases].
Among the other cases Professor D'Amato cited as evidence
that the Court has recognized that customary law could be made
in this way was the Nottebohm Case in which the Court relied
exclusively on a treaty as evidence of state practice. In
addition, he also cited the Court's extensive analysis of
several conventions in the Lotus Case. In Lotus, the Court
concluded the cited Conventions lacked a relevant customary
precedent regarding the immediate issue. But, by conducting
such an analysis, it implicitly recognized that treaties have
the potential for creating customary international law norms.
74 A. D'Amato, S note 73 at 104. See also I.
Brownlie, su ra note 30 at 5 and 12.
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elements required in the formation of customary international
75
law.
The element of opinio uris requires that the acts
constituting a general state practice in the first element
must be based upon a belief by the states that such acts are
legally required under international law. Motives such as
courtesy, fairness or morality may result in a general state
practice, but they will not produce customary international
law. 7
The pertinent rules from the MARPOL Protocol and London
Dumping Convention will now be examined by considering an
expanded analysis of these two basic elements.
1. Treaty Provisions Must Be Norm-Creating
Since only generalized rules within treaties can give
rise to a customary norm, an initial consideration is whether
the rules proposed have that characteristic.77 Not all acts
of state, including the act of signing a treaty, have this
Thus the reference in Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court to "international custom, as evidence
of a general practice accepted as law". Statute of the
International Court of Justice, supra note 30 at Art.
38(1)(b).
76 I. Brownlie, s note 30 at 8.
A. D'Amato, supra note 73 at 105-6.
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characteristic. On their face, the rules containing broad
prohibitions against discharge or disposal of crude oil in
certain marine waters indeed seem to be generalized.
79
In the North Sea Cases, the World Court considered what
was required for a generalized rule and developed one
methodology for determining, as it put it, whether a treaty
provision had a "fundamentally norm-creating character". 80
The Court analyzed the structure of the underlying treaty to
determine if it manifested an intent to have the cited
provisions generalizable into a rule of customary
international law while reserving other provisions solely to
the treaty.81 For example, a signatory's ability to opt out
of a treaty provision may signal the drafting parties' intent
78
Professor D'Amato describes how all acts of state,
including treaties, must be weighed as evidence of state
practice with this requirement in mind. He asserts that acts
involving economic or military aid, trade, establishment of
objective regimes such as international waterways, and the
creation of international servitudes all fail to create a
generalizable rule. He goes on to also exclude from
generalizable rules, agreements regarding the functions and
competencies of international organizations. Id.
79
Besides falling outside of the categories asserted
by Professor D'Amato in the previous footnote, the rules cover
broad categories of ocean-going vessels and fixed platforms.
The marine waters involved are similarly global in scope
though not all encompassing.
For waters covered under the MARPOL Protocol, see
infra note 37. The London Dumping Convention includes all
marine waters except the internal waters of a state. Infra
note 36 and the accompanying text.
N. Sea Cases, sunr note 73 at para. 72. See
generally Murry, A Discussion of the World Court's North Sea
Judgment, 19 Am. U.L. Rev. 470 (1970).
81 Id. See also A. D'Amato, supra note 73 at 110.
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not to generate a norm-creating provision.
The MARPOL Protocol's crude oil discharge restriction
contained within Annex I meets the North Sea Cases' manifest
intent test. Unlike the other several prohibitions against
discharge of certain pollutants within the Convention,
acceptance of the provision prohibiting the discharge of crude
oil is not subject to reservation by a state becoming a party
to the MARPOL Protocol. Additionally, the crude oil
restriction allows no exceptions to the obligation to prohibit
the discharge of crude oil at the option of states ratifying
or acceding to the Convention.
84
Applying the North Sea Cases' manifest intent test to the
London Dumping Convention, the crude oil disposal provision
2 N. Sea Cases, s note 73 at para. 72. (The Court
found that the Continental Shelf Treaty's equidistance rule
provisions was not norm-creating because parties were
permitted to exempt themselves from its application through a
reservation.)
MARPOL Convention, supra note 37 at Art. 13(1) and
Art. 14(1).
Although there are exceptions for ships discharging
crude oil in order to secure the safety of a ship or life at
sea and for discharge resulting from damage to a ship or its
equipment, these apply equally to all parties and are
therefore not optional at the discretion of a given party.
See MARPOL Convention, supra note 37 at Annex I (Reg. 11).
Similarly, the naval auxiliary exemption applies to
all parties rather than at the their individual option. Id.
at Art. 3(3).
In North Sea Cases, the Court found that the
availability of the optional delimitation mechanism of
negotiation and the allowance for deviation from the
equidistance method when another boundary line is justified by
special circumstances were additional factors depriving the
equidistance method of a norm-creating character.
31
likewise can also be considered to be of a norm-creating
character. While the Convention does not prohibit the making
of reservations, there is no partial ban on reservations such
as was the deciding factor in North Sea Cases. As with the
MARPOL Protocol, the London Dumping Convention also provides
no exceptions for the prohibition on disposal of crude oil at
the option of individual state parties such as the one which
86
troubled the Court in the North Sea Cases. In sum, it can
be said that the rules prohibiting dumping or discharging of
crude oil in certain marine waters by vessels and fixed
platforms meet the initial requirement for a customary norm:
that it be a generalized rule.
2. How General a Practice?
The World Court has put the burden of proving the
The Court noted that the Continental Shelf Convention
permitted reservation to the Article containing the
equidistance method while prohibiting making reservations to
other substantive articles. It then inferred from this
arrangement an intent not to create a generalizable rule
regarding the equidistance method in delineating the
continental shelf. Since it was the mixed reservation
provision that the Court found had robbed the pertinent treaty
provision of its norm-creating nature, the manifest intent
test arguably still permits an inference of generalizable rule
making intent on the part of the drafting parties where the
treaty is only silent as to reservations. See N. Sea Cases,
supra note 73 at para. 64.
868 Similar exceptions for safety and naval auxiliaries
provided for in the MARPOL Protocol are also available in the
London Dumping Convention. See London Dumping Convention,
s note 36 at Art. V and Art. VII(4).
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existence of a custom upon the party seeking to rely upon it
and has required that the rule invoked be shown to be in
accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the
87
states in question. But how uniform or general must that
practice be? Professor Brownlie states that substantial,
though not complete, uniformity is required. Given that
both domestic and international courts regularly declare rules
customary based upon thin evidence of usage, it is telling
that Professor Brownlie goes on to comment that the question
of how general a state practice must be is "very much a matter
of appreciation and a tribunal will have considerable freedom
of determination in many cases."89
In considering when a treaty rule can be said to have
become a rule of customary law, the World Court in North Sea
Cases said that where a considerable period of time has not
passed since the signing or entry into force of the treaty, it
is still possible for a customary rule to emerge from it if
there was a "very widespread and representative participation
in the convention".90 Like the Continental Shelf Convention
in the North Seas Cases, both the MARPOL Protocol and the
The Asylum Case, I.C.J. Reports (1950) at 276-7.
I. Brownlie, supra note 30 at 6. (The Professor
cites as support for this assertion the World Court's refusal
to accept a ten-mile rule for bays as a rule of customary law
in the Fisheries Case.)
89 Id.
90
North Sea Cases, supra note 73 at para. 73.
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London Dumping Convention are relatively recent treaties.
1
Since only about one-third of all states are parties to the
92
MARPOL Protocol and the London Dumping Convention , this
number is obviously inadequate to as yet constitute a general
practice among states in the view of the World Court.
93
3. Considering Relevant State Practice
Since treaties are only one form of state practice, it is
necessary when attempting to determine the existence of a
given customary norm to also consider what states are actually
91 As of 1991, it has been 13 years since the MARPOL
Protocol had been signed and 8 years since it had been
ratified. The London Dumping Convention had been signed 19
years before and had entered into force 16 years before
Similarly, at the time the World Court applied this test to
the Geneva Continental Shelf Convention, 10 years had passed
since its signing and 5 years since its entry into force.
929 A breakdown of these states, including those who have
signed both conventions is provided in Annex A.
93
It should be noted that at least the maritime
shipping nations were well represented. 14 of the 15 flag
states with the largest merchant fleets by deadweight tons had
become parties to the MARPOL Protocol and 12 of 15 had become
parties to the London Dumping Convention. The only flag state
with a large fleet not a party to either convention was
Singapore. See U. S. Dept. of Transportation, Maritime
Administration, The Annual Report of the Maritime
Administration for Fiscal Year 198 , Table 11 at 12.
Viewed another way, in the case of the MARPOL
Protocol, these states represent eighty percent of the total
world shipping tonnage. See R. Churchill and A. Lowe, The La
o e 252 (1988).
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doing in the world.94  Treaty ratification or adoption by
states is a reasonable predictor of a state's future conduct
and therefore relevant in assessing state practice. However,
it is also true that a state's actions subsequent to becoming
a party to a treaty which amount to a pattern of conduct
contrary to the treaty is also relevant in assessing state
practice since it may cast doubt upon the value of a state's
adherence to a given treaty as a predicting factor.
95
This is the situation in the case of the MARPOL Protocol.
As with its predecessor, the OILPOL Convention, states which
have become parties to the Protocol have generally failed to
enforce the prohibition against the discharge of crude oil in
96
specified waters. This lack of enforcement is not so much
a question of technical capacity in identifying polluters as
it is a lack of political will to follow-up treaty obligations
Weisburd, Customary International Law: The Problem
of Treaties, 21 Vand. J. Transnational L. 2,5,20 (1988).
95
Id. at 37.
96. R. Churchill and A. Lowe, supra note 93 at 254-5.
The authors point out that under the MARPOL
Protocol only flag states can enforce pollution standards
against a vessel polluting the high seas, which is where most
vessel-source pollution occurs. Additionally, flag states
have generally failed to meet reporting requirements regarding
enforcement actions taken against their own vessels. This
helps to undercut political and diplomatic efforts by other
parties or the IMO to require enforcement from states
identified as not enforcing treaty provisio"s.
See also J. Kindt supra note 34 dt 1173-4.
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with action.97  As such, this is further evidence that the
prohibition against discharge of crude oil contained in the
MARPOL Protocol does not yet constitute a general practice
among states.
4. The Element of Opinio Juris
Professor Weisburd has persuasively argued that for the
element of opinio juris to be satisfied with regard to a given
rule, states must believe not only that they are legally
obliged to obey the rule but also that their failure to do so
will result in their incurring legal obligations. This
would specifically involve both the right of another affected
state to question its conduct and the duty to correct the
breach of its obligation through some form of reparation.
99
Therefore, in order for a treaty to evidence the necessary
opinjrisLi with regard to a given customary norm, the treaty
must include provisions under which each party acknowledges
the right of other parties to inquire concerning possible
breaches and to receive reparations when affected by the
97
It has been possible since the early 1980's to in
effect "finger print" the cargo of each tanker through the use
of a gas chromatograph. Since each batch of crude oil has a
unique chemical compound, a sarple from an oil slick found in
marine waters or washed ashore on a beach can be traced back
to a particular ship and made the basis of an enforcement
action. See J. Kindt, supr note 34 at 742-3.




breach of duty under the treaty.
100
To a remarkable extent, the MARPOL Protocol evidences the
legal obligations discussed and can therefore be said to
satisfy the opinio juris element. Disputes regarding the
interpretation or application of the Convention may be settled
through negotiation between the affected states, but an
aggrieved party always retains the right to force an
arbitration of the dispute upon the offending party.
101
Although each party to the arbitration may appoint a member to
the three person arbitration tribunal, the Protocol specifies
that failure to make such an appointment within sixty days
will cause the seat to be filled by someone appointed by the
IMO instead.102  This procedure therefore avoids a deadlock
over the appointment of a suitable arbitration panel. The
Protocol also contains provisions specifying a five-month time
limit for rendering a decision and for the finality of the
arbitration award.103  The parties are also required to
immediately comply with the award.
104
In contrast, the London Dumping Convention limply
provides that the parties are to later consider procedures for
100 Id. at 23.
101 MARPOL Convention, supra note 37 at Art. 10.
102 Id. at Protocol II, Art. III & IV. (One of the
three members of the panel is always appointed by the IMO.)
103 Id. at Protocol II, Art. X.
104 id.
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the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation and
application of the Convention. An amendment providing for
the referral of disputes to either the World Court or to an
arbitration panel similar to that under the MARPOL Protocol
was proposed in 1978 but still has not garnered much
106
support. The Convention also calls for the parties to
agree on procedures for assessing liability and settling
107
disputes regarding dumping. No such procedures have been
developed. The continued reluctance of the parties to
provide a meaningful mechanism for enforcing legal rights
under the London Dumping Convention deprives this Convention
of the critical element of opinio luris necessary in order for
it to spawn a customary rule of international law.
5. Conclusions Regarding Marine Pollution Conventions
Evidencing Customary International Law
Under international law, restrictions upon the
109
independence of states cannot be presumed. The World
105 London Dumping Convention, supr note 36 at Art. XI.
106 Text in 18 I.L.M. 517 (1979).
As of 1990, only 13 of the necessary 42 acceptances
needed for its entry into force had been made.
107 London Dumping Convention, supra note 36 at Art. X.
108 1 R. Churchill and A. Lowe, supra note 93 at 270.
109 S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No.9 (Sept. 7) at 18.
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Court's decision in the North Sea Cases signaled its continued
reluctance to permit the development of international law
through a liberal application of the customary law
110
mechanism. This conservatism is well-founded, since, as
Professor Weisburd has pointed out, it makes no sense "to
label as international law rules that many states will not
obey and that very few states are willing to enforce against
violators". III While the MARPOL Protocol and London Dumping
Convention are noteworthy advancements of international
environmental law for the parties to them, they cannot yet be
said to contain rules of customary law binding upon non-party
states such as Iraq.
IV. Still Emerging Customary International Law
A. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea1
12
1. Introduction
After 14 years of negotiation among 150 nations, the
Jamaica Convention was opened for signature in 1982.
L. Nelson, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases and
Law-MakinQ Conventions, 35 Mod. L. Rev. 52, 56 (1972).
III
Weisburd, su ra note 94 at 45.
112 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261
[Hereinafter Jamaica Convention].
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Encompassing a wide variety of legal issues regarding the
world's ocean areas, the Convention includes a part consisting
of 45 articles devoted to the protection and preservation of
the marine environment. As of October, 1991, 50 states
including Iraq have become parties to the Convention.
However, the Convention will not enter into force until twelve
months after the 60th nation becomes a party to it.1
13
2. Provisions
The Jamaica Convention's environmental provisions
establish a general framework of powers and duties that states
have with regard to the marine environment. Most significant
about these provisions is a new emphasis on each party's duty
to protect the marine environment, while de-emphasizing the
traditional powers of the sovereign state.114  Parties have
the general duty to take measures necessary to prevent
115
pollution of the rr.-ne environment from any source. In
so doing, each party is committed to use the best practical
means at its disposal in accordance with its capabilities.
116
The Convention also makes clear that the duty to prevent
113 Id. at Art. 308(l).
114 Boyle, Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea
Convention, 79 A.J.I.L. 347 (1985) at 350.
115 Jamaica Convention, supra note 112 at Art.194.
116 Id.
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marine pollution extends to all sources of pollution
explicitly including intentional discharge of pollution from
vessels and installations operating in the marine
environment.
117
3. Application to the Iraqi Oil "Weapon"
The language of the Convention suggests that in enacting
national legislation to protect the marine environment, states
will be held to different standards depending on the type of
pollution involved. Regulation of pollution of the marine
environment through the atmosphere is left to the good faith
of individual states.118  Therefore, the Convention may not
provide much basis to argue the setting of the oil well fires
falls within the duties imposed by the Convention.
On the other hand, the provision regarding dumping from
ships and installations119 contains a minimum standard for
national legislation and other measures: nations are to adopt
laws and take other measures no less effective than global
120
rules and standards.
117 I., at Art. 194(3)(b) and (d).
118 Boyle, s note 114 at 354.
119
Art. I of the Convention defines dumping to include
"any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from
vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at
sea". Jamaica Convention supr note 112 at Art. I(5)(a)(i).
120 1 d. at Art. 210(6).
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Given that the Jamaica Convention creates a broad but
unspecified duty not to pollute the marine environment
followed by references to unclear international standards, the
Convention probably does not create an enforceable duty for
which Iraq can be held responsible. It at least can be said
that the Convention has advanced the state of international
environmental law by codifying expressly the earlier broader
state duty not to interfere as set forth in the Stockholm
Conference's Principle 21. This codification creates a surer
foundation for enforcing state responsibility for trans-
boundary pollution and pollution in commons areas at some
future point.
121
4. Is Iraq Bound by the Jamaica Convention?
a. Application of the Vienna Convention
Even if it could be said that the Jamaica Convention
created an enforceable duty upon Iraq as a Party to the
Convention, since the Convention has yet to enter into force,
122
it does not yet, of itself, bind Iraq. In addition, the
121 Boyle, supr note 114 at 367.
122 In this regard, Article 26 of the Vienna Convention
embodies the customary international law norm of pacta sunt
servanda: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith." (emphasis
added) Se Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 at Art. 26 [Hereinafter
Vienna Convention).
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Jamaica Convention will not apply retroactively once it does
enter into force since no special provision has been provided
for this within the Convention.
123
Nonetheless, there has existed since at least the late
1960's a customary international law norm obligating signatory
states not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior
124
to its entry into force. This norm emerged largely from
the process leading up to the signing of the Vienna
Convention. The process began with the creation of a
preliminary draft by the International Law Commission, which
began its work in 1951 and continued it into the mid-1960's.
Later, tiLi Draft Articles became the basis of the Vienna
Conference on the Law of Treaties that was held in 1968 and
1969. Over the course of twenty years of study and debate, it
For a discussion of whether or not the environmental
provisions of the Jamaica Convention reflect already existing
customary international law norms, see the next subsection.
123 The customary international law norm concerning
retroactive effects of treaties is reflected in Article 28 of
the Vienna Convention:
Unless a different intention appears from
the treaty or is otherwise established,
its provisions do not bind a party in
relation to any act or fact which took
place or any situation which ceased to
exist before the date of the entry into
force of the treaty with respect to that
party.
.e Vienna Convention supr_ note 122 at Art.
28.
124 Rogoff, The International Leaal Obligation of
Sianatories To An Unratified Treaty, 32 Me. L. Rev. 284
(1980).
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became evident that there was general agreement among states
that signatory states had such an obligation. The obligation
was eventually included as Article 18 to the Vienna
125
Convention. The question then becomes what such an
obligation means.
Reasonably, it should not mean that signatory states
commit themselves to the same obligations as states ratifying
the treaty. Such an interpretation would discourage states
from signing any treaty until close to the time they are
prepared to ratify it and only after the treaty has entered
into force. As states choose accession over signature in
order to preserve their freedom of action pending domestic
affirmation of the obligation, this would increase the
difficulty involved in concluding multilateral agreements.
126
The obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty means only that a signatory may not do something which
would render the provisions of the treaty involved impossible
to perform once it enters into force.127 Having ratified the
125 Id. at 287.
The Vienna Convention itself did not enter into
force until 1980. Iraq is neither a signatory nor a party to
the Vienna Convention.
126 1d6 at 299.
127 For example, a state signing a treaty to protect an
endangered animal species would defeat the object and purpose
of the treaty if prior to entry into force of the treaty it
funded a national hunting program which resulted in the
extinction of that species. Hence it would be impossible to
protect the species after the treaty entered into force as the
animal had been completely wiped out.
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Jamaica Convention, Iraq is still capable of complying with
the general duties imposed once the treaty enters into force.
The damage done in the oil spill and oil well fires will not
make it impossible for Iraq to subsequently protect the marine
environment.
b. Jamaica Convention Not Yet Customary
International Law
Many of the provisions of the Jamaica Convention closely
follow articles contained in the four Conventions adopted in
1958 by the First United Nations Law of the Sea Conference.
These Conventions have been so widely adopted by states that
they have become customary international law. This was
reflected in their incorporation into the Jamaica Convention
128
by consensus of the negotiating parties. As to these
provisions then, it can be said that the Jamaica Convention
merely reflects existing customary international law. Iraq
would therefore be bound by them even though the treaty has
not yet entered into force. Within the Jamaica Convention
those provisions not previously contained within the 1958
Conventions and not otherwise customary international law are
not yet binding on Iraq.
The only mention of marine pollution in the 1958
128 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Vol. 11, p.5 (1987)
[Hereinafter Restatement Third].
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Convention on the High Seas was a provision requiring the
parties to draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the
129
seas by discharge of oil from ships or pipelines. That
provision fell far short of creating a general duty to prevent
marine pollution such as exists under the Jamaica Convention.
Since the marine pollution provisions of the Jamaica
Convention are new, they cannot said to be customary based
upon the wide adoption of the 1958 Conventions. At the same
time, neither considerable time has passed nor widespread and
representative participation in the Jamaica Convention has
been achieved so that it can be said that the Convention
itself has spawned environmental customary norms.
B. The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on
State Responsibility
The International Law Commission, a subsidiary organ of
the General Assembly of the United Nations, has for over
thirty years been working to codify the law of state
responsibility which concerns internationally wrongful acts of
States. In 1980, the Commission completed the "first reading"
of Part I of its Draft Articles on State Responsibility which
129 1 Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29,1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 at Art. 24.
See N. Sea Cases, infra note 73 and accompanying
text. (Besides the fact that only 50 states have become
parties, none of those which have are significant maritime
nations.)
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is entitled "The Origin of Internationa: Responsibility".
131
In so doing, the Commission provisionally adopted the concept
that an international crime may result from a "serious breach
of an international obligation of essential importance for
safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such
as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or
the seas".132
The Commission's duties within the United Nations have
included both codifying rules of existing law as well as
promoting the progressive development of new law. In
practice, the Commission has sometimes mixed these tasks.
133
Given the present state of conventional and customary law on
the environment and the practice of states, the
characterization of massive pollution of the atmosphere or the
seas by a state as a crime would seem to fall within the
progressive development of the law tasking of the Commission.
While the Draft Articles may one day form the basis for state
131 Part I of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of its Twenty-Eighth Session, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
10) at 175 (1976), U.N. Doc. A/31/10. (Since 1980, the
Commission has been working on Part 2 of its Draft: "The
Content, Forms and Degrees of International Responsibility".)
For a summary of the Commission's work on this
draft, see S. McCaffrey, International Liability and
International Water Courses: The Work of the International Law
Commission Relating to International Pollution, in
International Law and Pollution 109 n. 7 (D. Magraw ed. 1991).
132 1 Part I of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, su ra note 131 at Art. 19(3)(d).
133 13I. Brownlie, supra note 30 at 31.
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liability for trans-boundary pollution, they do not presently
evidence existing customary law. In view of the still
tentative nature of the Commission's work in this area, the
legality of the Iraqi oil "weapon" cannot be determined by
reference to this Draft Article.
V. Principles of International Law Relevant to State
Responsibility for Extra-Territorial Pollution Injury
A. Introduction
The last primary source of international law cited in
Article 38 of the International Court is that of "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations". While
these principles are not specific rules formulated for direct
application to particular legal issues, they do provide
general legal truths common to developed legal systems which
act as guide posts in fashioning decisions in specific
134
cases. Although their precise character has been widely
135
debated, international courts and tribunals have
nonetheless repeatedly applied these principles in resolving
specific cases.136  As this paper will now develop, none of
these principles has developed to the point that it can be
said to have bound Iraq in its use of the oil "weapon".
134 B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by
International Courts and Tribunals 2-5 (1953).
135
136. Id. at 387-8.
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B. The General Principle of Non-Interference
In the view of the law, the world is composed of states,
each of which is internally sovereign (i.e. it has supreme
authority) within its borders as well as externally
independent to arrange its relations with other equally
sovereign and independent states as it wishes. 137 The
principle in international law of non-interference recognizes
this essential personality of nations. This principle makes
it the duty of each state to refrain from violating another
state's sovereignty and independence.1 38  This duty also
includes the duty to prevent its own agents and citizens from
violating another state's sovereignty and independence.
139
The duty of non-interference has been applied in a number
of contexts. The Corfu Channel Case has commonly been cited
for the International Court's statement of this principie.
14
137 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law 286 (H. Lauterpacht,
8th ed. 4th. printing 1960).
According to Judge Lauterpacht, the municipal law
principle "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" (use your own
property so as not to injure the property of another) is
equally applicable to relations between states as it is to
relations between individuals. Id. at 346.
Professor Cheng notes that municipal law principles
will naturally be applied by international courts and
tribunals in those cases where a basic analogy can be drawn
between the two systems. B. Cheng, supra note 134 at 391.
139 Id. at 288.
The Court held that it is "Every state's obligation
not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts
contrary to the rights of others". See Corfu Channel Case
(1949) I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22.
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As population, technology and awareness of the interrelated
nature of the world environment all grew, it became a logical
application of the international principle of non-interference
to apply it in cases involving trans-boundary pollution.
That application occurred in the Trail Smelter
Arbitration, which is famous as the first (and as yet only)
international adjudication of a pollution dispute.141  The
arbitration tribunal established in the case found Canada to
be responsible under international law for damage caused in
the United States resulting from air pollution originating
from the Trail Smelter plant in Canada. Under the unique
agreement establishing the arbitration, the tribunal
considered both U.S. domestic law as well as international
law. This unusual procedure, when added to the limited
precedential value of arbitration decisions, make Trail
Smelter a questionable precedent on which to rely on for an
extension of the principle of non-interference into the area
of trans-boundary pollution.
142
C. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Conference
A firmer foundation was laid during the United Nations
141 Trail Smelter Case, 3 United Nations Report of
International Arbitral Awards 1905 (1947).
142 See J. Barros and D. Johnston, The International Law
of Pollution 69-76 (1974).
5o
Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm,
Sweden, in 1972. At the conclusion of the Conference, the
representatives of 114 countries published a declaration which
included 26 principles upon which they felt states shared a
common conviction. In Principle 21, the delegates applied the
principle of non-interference to the environment, finding that
states have ". .a responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of
143
national jurisdiction. While the Stockholm Declaration
144
was only hortatory , nonetheless, it changed the way
143 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, Jun. 16, 1972, 11
I.L.M.1416.
Principle 21 extends the non-interference principle
to create liability for environmental damage done not only to
the territory of other states but also to the high seas and
other world commons areas. This is an unprecedented extension
of the non-interference principle and should be viewed
cautiously in light of the potentially tremendous expansion of
state liability beyond the political and economic capability
of most states to accept.
Principle 21 should therefore be viewed as an
established principle of international law only to the extend
that it makes a state responsible for environmental damage in
the territory and territorial sea of another state. See
Okidi, s note 29 at 72-3. See also L. Caldwell,
International Environmental Policy 122 (2nd. ed. 1990). But
see Restatement Third supra note 128 at Vol. II, Sec.
601(l)(b) 103.
This is underscored by the continued inability of
the parties to the London Dumping Convention who, despite
having specifically cited Principle 21 in the Preamble to the
Convention, have as yet been unable to develop procedures for
assessing liability and settling disputes regarding dumping in
accordance with this principle as called for in Article X of
that Convention.
It is further underscored by the continued general
state practice of permitting the emission of trans-boundary
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nations viewed the environment. Enforcement of the non-
interference principle awaits the further maturing of t7-
international law process, but its recognition in the context
of trans-boundary pollution has been established and the way
open for further development by states of international law in
145
this area.
pollution from their territory.
145 Some authors have asserted that the principle of
non-interference has been incorporated into the body of
customary international law with regard to transboundary
pollution. See e.g. Lee, International Law and the Canada-
United States Acid Rain Dispute, in International Law and
Pollution, s note 131 at 322.
Others point out that the bulk of state practice
supportive of such a norm has been limited to Europe and North
America. Hence it is of yet not sufficiently representative
to establish a customary law norm. See Magraw, Transboundary
Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of
International Liability, 80 A.J.I.L. 305 (1986) at 320.
Commenting on the noticeable lack of comparable
cases to Trail Smelter despite the passage of many years,
Professor Handl noted that most states are reluctant to submit
such issues to international adjudication. He also noted a
movement among states toward adopting soft norms which in turn
reflected a sense of soft responsibility for international
matters. See Proceedings, 77th Annual Meeting, American
Society of International Law 433-34 (1983) reprinted in J.
Sweeney, C. Oliver, N. Leech, The International Legal System
305 (3rd ed. 1988). This lack of comparable cases is further
evidcence that state practice has not yet sufficiently
developed for the creation of a customary law norm.
Even assuming the acceptance of Principle 21 as
customary international law, it would make little difference
in analyzing the legality of Iraq's behavior. Certainly,
international tribunals are more willing to rely upon
established customary international law norms than they are
principles of law. This reflects the lack of a definite
consensus among international lawyers on the precise
significance of the principles. See I. Brownlie, Princis
of Public International Law 15-17 (4th ed. 1990).
Nonetheless, even as customary law, Principle 21 is still too
general to solve concrete disputes. See Bothe, International
Leaal Problems of Industrial Siting in Border Areas and
National Environmental Policies in Transfrontier Pollution and
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VI. Conclusions Regarding Iraqi Liability Under International
Environmental Law
The spilling of a large quantity of crude oil in the
Persian Gulf at Sea Island Terminal and the igniting of over
500 oil well fires were violations of international
environmental law in that they violated Iraq's duty, as a
party to the Kuwait Regional Convention, to prevent the
pollution of the Persian Gulf by discharges from ships,
dumping from ships and discharges from land (including air-
borne means). These acts also violate the principle that a
state may not cause damage to the environment of other states.
However, as is so often the case in international law, the
conclusion of state responsibility for violation of treaty
provisions, customary norms and principles of international
law bring only the possibility of a legal beginning. Measures
for redressing this violation of international law will be
discussed in Part Three of this paper.
Part Two: Law of Armed Conflict Analysis
The international law of armed conflict has been in
development through much of recorded history, but has only
begun to really mature within the past century. The focus in
developing restrictions on combatants has been on limiting
the Role of States (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development 1981).
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unnecessary human suffering. Protection of the environment
has largely been left unaddressed.
146
Measuring the Iraqi conduct regarding the Sea Island
Terminal spill and the oil fires under the international law
of armed conflict can be done by considering two conventions:
the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land147 because of its customary law content; and
the 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War148 since Iraq is a party to
that Convention.
VII. Relevant Customary & Conventional International Law of
Armed Conflict
A. Development & Overview of Customary Law Under the
1907 Hague IV Regulations
The Hague IV Regulations provide rules for limiting the
146 An attempt to provide some protection for the
environment during international armed conflicts was made in
drafting Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The
merits of that attempt are analyzed in section XIII(A) page
139.
147 4 Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land (Hague IV), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, TS 539,
reprinted in A. Roberts & R. Guelff, Documents on the Law of
WarU 43 (1989) [Hereinafter Hague IV]. (Most of the substance
of this convention is contained in its Annex entitled
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.
Articles contained within the Annex will hereinafter be
referred to as Hague IV Regulations.)
148 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [Hereinafter GC].
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means of injuring the enemy and also rules for governing a
belligerent's control over enemy-occupied territory.
Pertinent to the Iraqi oil "weapon" are regulations that limit
a belligerent's seizure and use or destruction of enemy
property. The Regulations provide different limitations
depending on whether or not at the time the property is seized
or ordered destroyed, active military operations are underway
or an occupation of enemy territory has taken place. During
the course of active military operations, a belligerent may
seize or even destroy any enemy property, whether public or
private, so long as this is "imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war".149 "Active military operations" include
not only engaging in battle but also preparations for battle
or siege.
Once active military operations have ceased, a
belligerent occupying enemy territory may seize and keep cash,
149 Article 23(g) states: "In addition to the
prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially
forbidden- ... (g) To destroy or seize the enemy's property,
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war;..." Hague IV Regulations, supra note
147 at Art. 23. See also M. Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land
Warfare 281 (1959).
The emphasis on military necessity is further
underscored by Article 28: "The pillage of a town or place,
even when taken by assault, is prohibited. Hague IV
Regulations, Id. at Art. 28.
By pillage, it is generally meant the taking of
property by individual soldiers acting on their own. See G.
von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory... A Commentary
on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation 228 (1957).
L. Oppenheim, supr note 137 at Vol. II, 413.
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funds and securities belonging to the enemy state (though not
its individual citizens). A belligerent may also seize and
keep all enemy public movable property usable for military
operations.151  Public property which is not movable, but
which has a military nature, may be seized and used or even
destroyed if required by absolute military necessity.
152
Finally, real public property not of a military nature
may be seized and used in accordance with the rules applying
153
to one who is a usufructuary. In this capacity, a
151 Article 53 states:
An army of occupation can only take
possession of cash, funds, and realizable
securities which are strictly the
property of the State, depots of arms,
means of transport, stores and supplies,
and, generally, all movable property
belonging to the State which may be used
for military operations.
All appliances, whether on land, at
sea, or in the air, adapted for the
transmission of news, or for the
transport of persons or things, exclusive
of cases governed by naval law, depots of
arms, and generally, all kinds of
munitions of war, may be seized, even if
they belong to private individuals, but
must be restored and compensation fixed
when peace is made.
Hague IV Regulations, supra note 147 at
Art. 53.
152 Greenspan, supra note 149 at 287. (Included in this
category of property would be barracks and arsenals as well as
strategic assets such as bridges, docks and air fields.)
153 Art. 55 states:
The occupying state shall be regarded
only as administrator and usufructuary of
public buildings, real estate, forests,
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belligerent may use the property and extract products from it,
so long as this activity does not exceed what is usual or
154
necessary and does not damage the property. The duty to
act as a usufructuary continues until the occupied territory
is either restored to the possession of the enemy or annexed
by the occupying belligerent.
A belligerent occupying enemy territory has more limited
rights regarding private property, which may be seized only if
it has direct military use. After peace is made, such
property must be restored to the owner and compensation for
his or her losses made at that time.
155
and agricultural estates belonging to the
Hostile State, and situated in the
occupied country. It must safeguard the
capital of these properties, and
administer them in accordance with the
rules of usufruct.
Hague IV Regulations, supr note 147 at
Art.55.
154 Greenspan, supra note 149 at 288. (Thus crops may
be raised, timber cut and metals and minerals extracted from
mines.)
As in the area of active military operations, an
occupier may not pillage enemy property. See Hague IV
Regulations, supra note 147 at Art. 47.
155 Greenspan, supr note 149 at 296. See also Hague IV
Regulations, Art. 53, infra note 151.
Modern warfare, with its increased intensity and
scope, has arguable expanded the notion of what constitutes
"war munitions". To what extend this is so is uncertain.
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1. Extent to Which Iraq is Bound by the Hague IV
Regulations
At the time that the Hague IV Regulations were open for
signature, Iraq was part of Turkey, which signed but has never
ratified the Convention. Even if Turkey had become a party,
Iraq, even though a successor government to Turkey, still
would not have been bound by the Convention during the 1991
Gulf War. That is because in order to apply in an armed
conflict, the Convention requires that all belligerents must
be parties to it. 156 Neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia as well
as many other Coalition nations were parties to Hague IV.
Nonetheless, to the extent that it was the general
practice of states to follow the Hague IV Regulations out of
a belief that to do so is required under international law,
the Convention has become part of customary international
law.157 As reflective of customary law, the Hague IV
Regulations would be binding on Iraq notwithstanding the fact
that it is not a party to the Convention. A powerful
precedent for the proposition that the Hague IV Regulations
are customary international law is found in the Judgment of
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. In the
opinion of the Court, the rules laid down in Hague IV had by
1939 been recognized by all civilized nations and were
156 Hague IV, supra note 147 at Art. 2.
157 North Sea Cases, supra note 73.
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considered as being customary law. This opinion was
echoed by a 1946 U.N. General Assembly Resolution which
affirmed "the principles of international law recognized by
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the
Tribunal.",159  In 1950, the International Law Commission,
acting at the direction of the General Assembly, repeated the
International Military Tribunal's inclusion of the
prohibitions enumerated by the Hague IV Regulations as crimes
punishable under international law. The concept that the
Hague IV Regulations were binding on all states was therefore
158 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. XXII, IMT
Secretariat, Nuremberg, 1948, 497, reprinted in Roberts and
Guelff suara note 147 at 155. (The Court's opinion affirmed
the Allies' decision to include among the "war crimes" listed
in the Charter of the Tribunal the "plunder of public or
private property" and "devastation not justified by military
necessity." Id at 413-14.)
159 Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During
the Second Part of Its First Session From 23 October to 15
December 1946 (1947), G.A. Res. 95, Dec. 11, 1946, reprinted
in D. Djonovich, United Nations Resolutions, Vol. I, 175
(1973).
Although U.N. General Assembly Resolutions are in
general not binding upon member states, when they concern
general norms of international law and are accepted by a
majority vote, they evidence the opinion of states and
therefore serve as a forum for state practice. As this
resolution meets such criteria, it is part of the customary
law process. See I. Brownlie, supra note 30 at 14-15 and 695.
(Professor Brownlie specifically cites this resolution as an
example of an important law-making U.N. General Assembly
Resolution.)
Principles of International Law Recognized in the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the
Tribunal, adopted by the U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n (1950),
Principle VI(b), reprinted in D. Schindler and J. Toman, The
Law of Armed Conflict: A Collection of Conventions.
Resolutions and Other Documents 835 (1981).
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well published and of long-standing by the time Iraq invaded
Kuwait.
B. Development & Overview of Conventional Applicable Law
Under 1949 Geneva Convention IV
Following World Wars I & II, a further attempt was made
to codify rules governing conduct of belligerents during armed
conflict. Unlike the Hague IV Regulations, where the emphasis
had been on the treatment of combatants, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 focused on protecting non-combatants. It
was the intent of the parties of the GC to build upon, rather
than replace, the Hague IV Regulations regarding protections
161
for civilian property. Since the Hague IV rules covered
the issue of enemy property rather extensively, relatively
little mention is made of the subject in the GC. Nonetheless,
the GC does state that a belligerent occupying enemy territory
may only destroy real or personal property, whether public or
private, if such destruction is required by absolute necessity
162
of military operations. This article was intended to add
161 1 Article 154 of the GC explicitly states that parties
to the GC who are also parties to the Hague IV Regulations
will continue to be bound by the Regulations, with the GC
being viewed as supplementary to the Regulations. See GC,
suira note 148 at Art. 154.
Art. 53 states:
Any destruction by the Occupying Powers
of real or personal property belonging
individually or collectively to private
persons or to the State, or to other
60
a specific prohibition against destroying private property
absent absolute military necessity.163  As to Rulic
property, the GC therefore repeats the restriction of the
Hague IV Regulations not to destroy it without military
necessity.
Having become a party to the GC in 1956, Iraq would of
course be bound by this provision.
C. Nature of Kuwaiti/Iraqi Crude Oil
The Iraqi act of discharging crude oil into the Gulf and
setting fire to the oil wells involved two aspects of
destruction of enemy property: the destruction of the oil
itself and also the resulting additional damage and
destruction to the ecosystem within Saudi and Kuwaiti
territorial waters. With regard to the latter, the legality
of destroying this property turns on the nature of the oil.
It is therefore first necessary to determine the answer to
Public authorities, or to social or
cooperative organizations, is prohibited,
except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military
operations.
Id. at Art. 53.
163 H. Levie, The Code of International Armed Conflict,
Vol. 2, 766 (1986). (Articles 23(g) and 53 of the Hague IV
Regulations could be read to only prohibit unnecessary
destruction of public property and unnecessary seizure of
private property.)
The GC also states that pillage of property
belonging to enemy civilians in the hands of a belligerent is
prohibited. See GC, supra note 148 at Art. 33.
61
three questions concerning the nature of the Kuwaiti oil
involved 164: Was the Kuwaiti oil public or private property;
movable or immovable in nature; and located within the land
occupied or annexed by the enemy?
1. Public or Private Property
Since 1980, the entire oil industry of Kuwait has been
owned and operated by the Kuwaiti government through the
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. This remarkable enterprise
operates a vertically integrated oil company extending from
the extraction of crude oil in the ground, through the
refining of it into numerous petroleum products, to the actual
marketing of some of these products at government owned gas
165
stations throughout Western Europe. The Kuwaiti crude
used by the Iraqis in the oil spill and destroyed in the oil
well fires was therefore state-owned property.
164 As previously detailed, the Iraqi oil weapon
involved two sources: Iraai crude oil pumped from oil tankers
berthed at the Mina al Ahmadi port facility; and Kuwaiti crude
oil pumped from and burned at Kuwaiti oil storage facilities
and Kuwaiti oil fields.
Under the international law of armed conflict cited
above, Iraq was free to destroy its own oil by discharging it
into the Gulf. However, as to any damage done to enemy state
or private property in the process, Iraq would continue to be
subject to the restriction already discussed: that any such
destruction is justified only on the basis of military
necessity for doing so.
165 J. Anthony, Arabia: Kuwait, The New Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Macropaedia (1989).
62
2. Movable or Immovable Property
The Hague IV Regulations draw distinctions in the area of
occupations between public property which is movable and used
for military operations and public property that is immovable
166
such as buildings, forests and agricultural estates. These
distinctions determine the degree of use to which a
belligerent may put the enemy government property. It has
been argued in the context of Israel's occupation of the Sinai
that crude oil could be viewed as movable public property
167
which may be used for military operations. While this is
an interesting argument, it violates the common sense notion
of the nature of crude oil. After all, crude oil is buried
under ground, and must first, by means of increasingly complex
machinery in the hands of skilled technicians, be extracted,
stored, transported, refined and distributed before it may be
used for military operations. Timber from forests and
166 Hague IV Regulations, Articles 53 and 55, infra
notes 151 and 153.
167* Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent
Occupation and Human Rights, 8 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights
104, at 130 (1978).
See Sirgaore Oil Stocks Zase, Singapore, Court of
Appeal, 1956, 23 I.L.R. 810, 51 A.J.I.L. at 802 (1957). ( The
majority opinion found Britain's seizure of Dutch owned crude
oil from Japanese military forces as "war booty" to be
illegal. In so doing, the Court rejected the argument that
crude oil was a war munition (and hence movable property).)
But see E. Wallach, Treatment of Crude Oil as a Munition de
Guerre: A Reexamination of United States Policy in the Light
of Past Practice, (January 21, 1991) (unpublished -anuscript).
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crops from agricultural estates are specifically listed as
forms of immovable property in the Hague IV Regulations.
169
If goods such as these are explicitly listed in the key
provision of the Convention as immovable goods, then crude
oil, which require considerably more processing before being
consumed than timber and crops, can readily be viewed as
immovable property as well.
3. Active Military Operations, Occupation or Annexation
The laws of armed conflict outlined above only apply if
the alleged violations occurred during active military
operations or during an occipation. If Iraq had successfully
annexed Kuwait by mid-January, then the laws of armed conflict
would not have applied. Active military operations end and
occupation begins when a territory is actually placed under
170
the authority of a hostile army. Once an invasion into
another state renders the enemy government incapable of
publicly exercising its authority, the invader has
successfully substituted his own authority in the
169 Hague IV Regulations, supra note 147 at Art. 55.
170 Hague IV Regulations, Art. 42 states: "Territory is
considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to
the territory where such authority has been established and
can be exercised."
Id. at Art. 42.
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territory. 171
Occupation is expected to be a temporary condition. The
original government will either reassert its authority through
force of arms or a negotiated settlement, or the belligerent
state will legally annex the occupied territory. A
belligerent may lawfully annex a territory only after the
state of war from which the occupation arose has ceased. So
long as the ousted government is substantially continuing the
general hostilities arising from the initial invasion,
annexation cannot be legally effective.
172
Once annexation is effected, then all property belonging
to the previous government becomes the property of the new
173
government which invaded the territory. The Hague IV
Regulations and GC Art. 53 would therefore no longer apply
since the territory is no longer occupied, and the title of
the former state's property has been transferred to the
invading belligerent state. This is provided for explicitly
171 G. von Glahn, supra note 149 at 28.
Iraq was able to achieve the occupation of Kuwait
within 3 days of the August 2nd invasion, as Kuwaiti organized
resistance quickly collapsed. Although active hostilities
renewed in January, 1991 with the opening of the Coalition air
war, the August-December 1990 period was a period of military
occupation.
172 J. Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict
720 (1954).
173 Oppenheim, supra note 137 at 397.
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within the GC.174 Iraq was able to crush all opposition by
Kuwaiti conventional forces and install a puppet government
only two days after the start of its invasion.175  It
promptly thereafter declared that it had "comprehensively and
eternally merged" with Kuwait, making it a province of
176
Iraq.
However, two things prevented Iraq from legally asserting
annexation of Kuwait. First, the Emir of Kuwait was able to
flee the country and to gather surviving Kuwaiti conventional
forces in order to continue hostilities. Second, the United
Nations Security Council condemned the Iraqi invasion as a
177
breach of international peace and security and decided
that the annexation itself was illegal, null and void.
178
174 Art. 6 states in pertinent part:
... In the territory of Parties to the
conflict, the application of the present
military Convention shall cease one year
after the general close of military
operations; However, the Occupying Power
shall be bound, for the duration of the
occupation, to the extent that such Power
exercises the function of government in
such territory, by the provisions of the
following articles of the present
Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47,
49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143...
GC, supra note 148 at Art. 6.
175
J. Whelan, World Affairs: Middle East and North
Africa- Kuwait, 1991 Britannica Book of the Year 411 (1991).
176 Id.
177
S.C. Res. 660, Aug. 2, 1990, (S/RES/660(1990)).
178 S.C. Res. 663, Aug. 9, 1990, (S/RES/663(1990)).
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Since Iraq never lawfully annexed Kuwait, this paper will
analyze the Iraqi oil spill and oil well fires in the context
of both active military operations, as suggested above, as
well as in the context of an occupation, to be discussed
below.
D. Conclusion Regarding Rule to Be Applied
The Kuwaiti oil released from the Sea Island Terminal
and burned from oil wells throughout Kuwait was immovable
public property. Depending on the intent one imputes to the
Iraqis, the international law to be applied is either that of
treatment of enemy property during active military hostilities
or during occupation. If we assume the intent behind the oil
spill and oil well fires was to employ a means to injure
Coalition forces in the context of ongoing hostilities, then
the legal test is that of imperative (or absolute) military
necessity as outlined by the Hague IV Regulations, Article
23(g) and GC, Article 53. On the other hand, if we assume the
Iraqis acted out of an intent to destroy the public property
of Kuwait, then the legal test is the duty both as a
usufructuary as outlined by the Hague IV Regulations, Article
55 and a belligerent again under GC, Article 53. The Sea
Island spill and the oil well fires will be analyzed under
each theory.
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E. The Sea Island Terminal Oil Spill as a Means Employed
During Active Military Operations
There are a number of facts which support a theory that
the Iraqis intended to use the Sea Island oil spill as a
weapon against Coalition forces. First, the timing of the
release suggests it was done out of fear of an imminent U.S.
amphibious landing on the Kuwaiti coast. Although the Iraqis
could have destroyed the oil by releasing it into the sea in
early August, they chose not to do so until January 19th.
This was only 3 days after the Coalition began its air
campaign. The lack of resistance met during the initial days
of the air war suggests that the Iraqis did not expect an
offensive by Coalition forces. When that attack came, the
shock was therefore all the greater. Knowing that the U.S.
had a potent amphibious force steaming near the Kuwaiti
coast179 and being stunned by the air attack, the Iraqi
commanders may have feared an imminent assault from the sea
for which they had not fully prepared, and in desperation,
decided to cause the massive oil spill in order to hamper such
a ianding. With water currents and prevailing winds in the
Persian Gulf at the time of release moving counterclockwise,
the Iraqis could have expected the slick to move generally
179 Zolton, Amphibious Feints Force Irais to Squander
Manpower, Navy Times, Mar. 11, 1991 at 12. (During the Desert
Storm build-up, Marine forces staged several large amphibious
assault exercises. These were well covered by the media,
which was given greater than usual access to the forces
practicing on these occasions.)
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south albeit with uncertainties as to speed and movement
adjacent to the shoreline.
1 80
U.S. analysts pointed to several potential tactical
purposes for the spill. The oil could conceal floating
contact mines sowed along the beach approaches. It could also
foul the intakes of amphibious assault craft and even larger
amphibious warfare ships operating in waters near the beaches.
Both craft rely on water drawn from the sea for cooling. More
speculative, would be an intent to ignite the oil off beaches
once the actual amphibious landing commenced.
Another motive for using the oil slick as a weapon had
potentially far greater consequences for Coalition forces. If
the slick was able to inundate the Saudi coast line as far
south as the cities of Jubail and al-Khobar, it could force
the closure of desalinization plants. These plants supplied
almost all the drinking water for Saudi Arabia's Eastern
Province and for the capital city of Riyadh. Included within
this area were more than 600,000 U.S. and other Coalition
181
ground troops. Cutting off drinking water would have
Atkinson and Balz, sra note 8 at Al.
However, according to U.S. Coast Guard officials,
prevailing winds in January were northwesterly from the Saudi
coast tending to keep the oil off the coast. See Isikoff,
Wind Called Key Factor in Damage From Oil Spill, Wash. Post,
Jan. 31, 1991 at A24.
181 Lippman and Booth, sura note 2 at 13 and 16. ( The
desalinization plants work on a "reverse osmosis" process
which uses sensitive filters to screen out salt molecules from
the water. If oil reached the filters, they would be
overwhelmed and the plants unable to operate.)
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disastrous effects on troops operating in the desert heat. A
secondary benefit of a successful shut-down of the
desalinization plants would be the closing of Saudi Arabia's
largest industrial complex at Jubail, including electric
generating plants. These electric utilities and manufacturing
182
plants rely on fresh water for cooling.
If such was the Iraqi intent, was the oil release
justified by military necessity? If Hague IV Regulations
Article 23(g) permits destruction of enemy property when
"imperatively demanded by the necessities of war" m3, and GC
Article 53 permits destruction of property when "rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations ,184  did the
Iraqi destruction of up to 3 million barrels of oil belonging
to the Kuwait government and the vast ecological damage within
the territorial waters of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia meet these
tests?
1. The Concept of Military Necessity
Neither military manuals nor learned law texts provide a
precise definition of the concept of military necessity.
185
182 Isikoff, Saudis Brace for Onslaught of Oil Slick,
Wash. Post, Jan. 27, 1991 at A22.
Hague IV Regulations, Art. 23(g), infra note 147.
GC, Art. 53, infra note 151.
G. von Glahn, supra note 149 at 225.
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According to Professor McDougal, "... this concept may be said
to authorize such destruction, and only such destruction, as
is necessary, relevant, and proportionate to the prompt
186
realization of legitimate belligerent objectives". The
concept therefore includes several elements. First, there
must be a need for the use of the force to further the defeat
of the enemy. Second, the force used must be capable of being
regulated. Third, an element of proportionality in which the
collateral damage caused in the attack must not be
disproportionate to the military gain expected. A gross
disparity between the amount of destruction resulting and the
military results achieved would be evidence of lack of
187
military necessity. While the character of military
necessity is more a modest concept than an absolute rule, it
nonetheless provides a limit on the action of the military
commander. This is confirmed by the rejection during the
post-World War II war crimes trials of the German doctrine of
kriegsraison, under which the military commander had unlimited
discretion in committing acts of destruction in furtherance of
189
war aims. The military necessity concept is one of
reasonableness under the conditions in which the use of force
186 M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World
Public Order 72 (1961).
187 M. Greenspan, su ra note 149 at 280.
M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, supra note 186 at 80.
189 M. Greenspan, su R note 149 at 279.
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was made. Therefore, no general rule can be established in
defining what is military necessary. Each instance must be
judged based on the facts peculiar to it.
190
2. Military Necessity of the Sea Island Terminal Spill
The U.S. amphibious forces and the desalinization plants
were both "legitimate military objectives". As regular armed
forces of the enemy, the amphibious forces were obviously
legitimate targets. The desalinization plants were also
legitimate targets given the tremendous impact within a short
time that their shut-down would have had on the effectiveness
191
of Coalition ground forces. But having met the first
G. von Glahn, supra note 149 at 226.
191 Some might argue that since these vital facilities
provided water to 18 million civilians living in the area,
they should be legally immune from attack. The debilitating
effect the cut-off would have had on the 600,000 Coalition
ground forces would nonetheless have justified the targeting
of the plants.
It should also be pointed out that the Coalition
air campaign shut down the Baghdad city water system as a
result of successful attacks upon the electric utilities and
chlorine factories on which it relied to operate its water
filtration plants. As a result, there was a significant
chance of devastating cholera and typhoid epidemics developing
among the city's 4 million inhabitants if repairs could not
quickly be made. See Okie, Health Official Sees Threat of
Epidemics in Iraq, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1991 at A10. See also
Hockstader, Water Problems Pose Health Crisis in Iraai
Capital, Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1991 at A15.
It is therefore evident that the U.S. did not
consider water facilities immune from shutdown when there were
otherwise legitimate reasons for attacking supporting
facilities. Since the electric grid also served military
installations and other war-supporting activities, and
chlorine may be used to manufacture poison Vas, the U.S.
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elements of military necessity, the oil "weapon" fails the
remaining two elements.
First, the "weapon" chosen by the Iraqis to attack the
amphibious force and desalinization plants was too unregulated
to be reasonably certain that its use would result in the
damage to the military objective sought. The movement of the
released oil from the terminal 10 miles off the Kuwaiti coast
was completely dependent on winds and currents. It could not
be reasonably predicted whether the oil would hug the coast
far enough south to actually inundate beach areas in Kuwait or
the desalinization plants in Saudi Arabia. In fact, as of
mid-February, the oil was trapped in an area off the Saudi
coast well north of Jubail but far south of potential beach
192
assault areas in Kuwait. In comparison, even the Scud
missile appeared to be highly accurate.
Additionally, further reducing the probability of success
was the ability of the Saudis to deploy a protective system of
oil booms to keep the oil from reaching the intakes at
desalinization and electric utility plants. The Saudis had
extensive experience with using booms because of the
considered each to be legitimate targets for attack.
192 *Society of Organizations for Reparations for the
Environment, press conference, Mar. 19, 1991, Dr. Malcolm
Spaulding, NEXIS, currntfile:Kuwait Regional Convention.
[Hereinafter SORE.]
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occurrence of previous oil spills in the Gulf.
193
In regard to the anticipated amphibious landing, the
argument is even more compelling. Besides the uncertainty
that the oil would actually reach any beach areas in
significant quantities, the oil would only remain in effective
concentrations for a few days after release. It was estimated
that a third of the oil dissipated within two days of the
release.194  Since Sea Island Terminal is located well south
of the Kuwaiti coast, most of the shoreline would not be
covered by the slick, including those areas around Kuwait City
and Basra.
195
In-addition, U.S. officials claimed, at least publicly,
that it would be difficult to ignite crude oil floating on
196
water. It is interesting to note that in anticipation of
193 Isikoff, su ra note 182 at A22.
How effective the booms would have been was open to
much debate. It was said that seas often reached nine feet in
January, which would have been large enough to overcome the
booms. Additionally, some officials feared the oil would sink
to the bottom and be pulled under the boom by tidal action.
See Longo, Saddam's Oil Spill Weapon Deemed 'Environmental
Terrorism', Navy Times, Feb. 11, 1991, at 25.
194 SORE, supra note 192.
195 Gellman, Theories Vary on Motive for Spill, Wash.
Post, Jan. 26, 1991 A16.
196 196 at A13. (Coast Guard ADM Kime commented that
such a technique could have been useful in cleaning up the
Exxon Valdez spill but was simply not feasible. Other
officials pointed out that whatever ability there was to
ignite the oil would diminish each day the oil was in the
water. Nonetheless, some officials suggested that it might be
possible to combine gasoline with crude oil to create a
combustible mixture.)
74
an invasion of Great Britain by the German Army in 1940, both
the British and the Germans carried out extensive experiments
to test the practicality of covering water surface areas
adjacent to beaches where amphibious landings were imminent
with burning oil. 197 Both belligerents reached the
conclusion that the plan was unworkable.
198
The Iraqi oil "weapon" also fails the last element of
military necessity in that the collateral damage done to
defeat an amphibious landing was completely disproportionate
to the objective sought. The list of short and long-term
environmental damage in the Gulf discussed earlier details the
extensive effects on the economy and ecosystem.
In conclusion, a weighing of all these elements
establishes a lack of military necessity for the Sea Island
Terminal spill if the intent behind it was to attack Coalition
197 B. Collier, The Defense of the United KinQdom 133
(1957). (The British established a small Petroleum Warfare
Department, which tested a number of flame weapons, including
attempts to "set the sea on fire".)
See also W. Ansel, Hitler Confronts England 244
(1960). (Both the German Army and Navy studied the problem
with a view toward overcoming any British use of this
"weapon". Both services developed workable counter-measures.
The Navy found that special fire-fighting tugs could be used,
each towing a long chain of logs. The logs would be
maneuvered to corral the burning oil and then tow it out to
sea. It would then be extinguished by means of materials
carried aboard the tugs.)
They found that the oil had to be both light enough
to ignite readily but heavy enough to sustain a continuing
blaze. The German Navy found it took an extravagant amount of
oil which then had to be boosted with gasoline and special
ignition methods. The scheme was found to be most workable in
isolated areas such as marshlands behind the beaches. See
Ansel, supa note 197 at 244.
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forces.
F. The Oil Well Fires as a Means Employed During Active
Military Operations
There is some evidence suggesting that the oil well fires
were ignited by the Iraqis as a method of obscuring military
targets from attack by Coalition forces, particularly from the
air. Once again, the timing of the setting of the fires
would be consistent with such an intent. The first group of
wells were ignited in the Wafra field at about the same time
as the Sea Island Terminal oil release. This coincided with
the beginning of the Coalition air campaign, which had
included targets in southern Kuwait where the Wafra Field was
located. This act was small compared to the attempted arson
of virtually every Kuwaiti oil well during a 5-day period in
February immediately preceding the commencement of the
Coalition's ground offensive.
The black smoke emitted from the furiously burning wells
can serve two tactical purposes. First it can obscure visual
acquisition of military targets. Pilots particularly need to
see small targets such as tanks and artillery emplacements in
order to drop their bombs accurately. 90-95% of all air
munitions used in the war were "dumb" bombs, the successful
delivery of which requires knowing where the target is well in
76
advance of their release.199 While some aircraft carry radar
capable of identifying large fixed targets, accuracy can be
degraded when the pilots are unable to actually see the
target. The smoke can also cause pilots to have to drop lower
in altitude in order to spot the target. This makes them more
vulnerable to anti-aircraft gun fire.
200
Secondly, the smoke can affect the accuracy of "smart"
bombs which rely on either a television-type picture
transmitted from a camera located in the nose of the bomb or
on a laser beam illuminating the target and usually emanating
from an aircraft overhead. The smoke can.obscure the "view"
of the target for the camera as well as interrupt the laser
beam on which the bomb depends in locating its target.
201
1. Military Necessity of the Oil Well Fires
If the Iraqi intent in burning crude oil from over 500
wells and attempting to do so in 300 more was to obscure Iraqi
military targets, was this action justified by military
necessity? As with the Sea Island Terminal oil spill, the
analysis again centers on the concept of military necessity.
The element requiring a "legitimate military objective"
199 Smith and Richards, Numerous U.S. Bombs Probably
Missed Tarqets, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1991 at A25.
200 Murphy, supra note 3 at A13.
201 Smith and Richards, supra note 199 at A31.
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is easily met in seeking to create smoke to hide military
targets from enemy view. But like the oil spill, it is more
difficult to meet the second element; that the methods used be
capable of being regulated. The direction the smoke blew in
was completely dependent upon the direction of the wind.
Although it generally blew toward the south, this was subject
to change.
202
The actual effectiveness in obscuring targets was also
questionable. While there were instances in which attack
planes returned from missions without dropping bombs or
203diverted to secondary targets because of the smoke
overall, it had little impact on Coalition military
204
operations. The phenomenal speed at which Coalition
ground forces were able to advance into Kuwait is another
indication of the relative military insignificance of the
hindrance caused by the oil well fires.
The Iraqis also clearly failed on the proportionality
202202 Murphy, supra note 3 at A13.
Several such instances were reported. Id. See also
Atkinson and Claiborne, Iraq Says Retreat Ordered: U.S. Calls
Move Insufficient, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1991 at Al. See also
Atkinson and Devroy, Allies Meet Little Resistance. Capture
Thousands of POWs, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1991 at Al.
204 Murphy, Allied Forces Invade Kuwait As Bush Orders
Ground A Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1991 at Al. (Quoting allied
officials.)
Although smoke obscured almost half of Kuwait to
some degree, pilots found that at specific targets the smoke
could appear thick at certain angles but be thin enough
directly overhead to permit accurate bombing. See Zolton,
Carrier Air Stung Saddam with 16.000 Sorties, Navy Times, Mar.
II, 1991 at 36.
78
element of military necessity. In return for a very marginal
and short-term tactical advantage on the battlefield, the
Iraqis ignited fires which took ten months to extinguish,
causing the loss of $20 million a day in revenue and spewing
toxics and carcinogens into the atmosphere. The long-term
economic and health costs are significantly in excess of the
military benefits in making targeting marginally more
difficult during the few days it took for the Coalition forces
to retake Kuwait.
G. The Oil Spill & Oil Well Fires as Vandalism During
the Occupation
While there is obviously some argument to be made and
facts to support a theory that the Iraqis used the Sea Island
Terminal oil spill and the oil well fires as weapons against
the Coalition forces, a much stronger case can be made that
these were simply acts of vengeance by a brutal occupier.
This motivation would be completely consistent with other acts
committed by the Iraqis during the occupation. From the early
days of the occupation, Iraq permitted extensive pillage of
private property by its soldiers, while carrying on its own
organized state effort to systematically plunder both private
and public property. Stores, businesses, banks, public
buildings and even hospitals were picked through, and medical




As the Coalition's air campaign progressed and the ground
war loomed, the Iraqis turned to vandalize what could not be
removed. Hotels, government institutions, public utilities,
and oil production facilities were all damaged. The Iraqis
even took the time to damage Kuwait City's Planetarium, the
Zoo and to blow up one of the five historic gates of the Old
206
City Wall. In this greater context, the Sea Island
Terminal spill of up to 3 million barrels of oil and the arson
of over 500 oil wells appear as additional acts of vengeance
heaped on Kuwait.
That Iraq intended the oil release and fires as vandalism
is also supported by the fact that President Saddam Hussein
had threatened to pollute the Persian Gulf with oil and set
the oil wells ablaze months before the January Coalition air
campaign began. As noted above, he had threatened to do both
of these things shortly after the August invasion. In fact,
captured Iraqi military orders to corps commanders issued on
January 17th (one day after the Coalition air campaign
205 J. Whelan, sura note 175. See also Branigan,
Kuwait's Treasures Vandalized, Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 1991 at
A21.
206 Branigan, supra note 205. (As an example of the
mean-spirited nature of the vandalism, at the century old Sief
Palace, home of the Kuwaiti royal family, the Iraqis destroyed
a portion of the building facade with gunfire and burned down
the wing of the Palace used as the Emir's offices. The
library was ransacked, with rare books scattered on the floor
amid human defecation, smashed furniture and the remains of
small fires that had been set in an unsuccessful attempt to
set the whole library ablaze.)
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commenced) instructed the commanders to destroy oil fields
during the battle with Coalition forces.207 This general
plan to vandalize Xuwait's oil resources, irrespective of any
military need to do so, became evident when the Iraqis
systematically destroyed all Kuwaiti oil facilities within the
span of a week.
The term "usufruct" means literally "to use the fruit".
As a usufructuary of the Kuwaiti government's crude oil, Iraq
was permitted to extract the crude oil from Kuwait's oil wells
at the same rate that the Kuwaitis themselves had been
208
extracting it. They were then permitted under the
usufructory principle to sell the crude oil or process it into
petroleum products for its own use. Only when the belligerent
occupier extracts fruits from state property in a wasteful or
negligent manner, so that the capital value of the property is
affected, are its duties as a usufructuary violated.20
9
Setting fire to oil well heads so that the crude oil
feeding them burns uncontrollably is wasteful in itself. But
by destroying the control mechanisms that had limited Kuwait's
oil production to 2 million barrels a day, the Iraqis have
caused the oil to escape the fields at a rate that risks
207 Atkinson and Claiborne, supra note 18 at Al.
208 M. Greenspan, supra note 149 at 288.
209 J. Stone, supr note 172 at 714.
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severely damaging them. The Iraqi destruction of the
crude oil dumped in the Persian Gulf and burned at the well
heads violated its duty as a usufructuary in occupied Kuwait
under the Hague IV Regulations. At the same time, this
destruction violated Iraq's duty, under Article 53 of the GC,
not to destroy enemy property unless absolutely necessary for
military operations.
VIII. The Legality of the Iraqi Oil "Weapon" Under A
"Scorched-Earth" Policy
A. Present State of the Law
President Bush, condemning the sabotage of the oil wells
and facilities, characterized the Iraqi actions as a
"scorched-earth policy".211 This term usually refers to a
policy of general devastation of public and private property
employed by an army during a retreat in the face of advancing
212
enemy forces. The President apparently assumed that a
210 Branigan, Kuwait's Environmental. Economic
Niahtmare, Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 1991 at A35. (As evidence of
this danger, sore wellheads are spouting white smoke,
indicating that underground water which provides the pressure
for some reservoirs is being sucked up to the surface along
with the crude oil. This will adversely affect the long-term
efficiency of the fields.)
211 Schwartz, etc., supra note 16 at 38.
212 G. von Glahn, supra note 149 at 228.
Professor Lauterpacht adds that a scorched-earth
policy can also be used to suppress a levy en masse or
dispersed small bands of enemy troops in an occupied
82
scorched-earth policy is per se illegal. In fact, the law of
armed conflict continues to recognize the lawfulness of a
campaign of general destruction of enemy property under
certain circumstances.
A scorched-earth campaign, like any other destruction of
enemy property, must meet the requirement of Hague IV
Regulations Article 23(g) and GC Article 53. That is, such a
campaign must be "imperatively demanded by the necessities of
war" or otherwise "rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations". Before such a campaign is carried out, there
must be no better or less severe way to achieve the
operational goal behind the campaign.
213
That a scorched-earth policy can still be a lawful tactic
was confirmed by the judgment rendered by the United States
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the case of General Lothar
Rendulic.214  Pertinent to this discussion among a number of
charges against General Rendulic was the allegation that he
had committed a war crime by ordering the wanton destruction
of private and public property in the province of Finnmark,
Norway during the retreat of his 20th Mountain Army. Rendulic
territory. Since such general destruction would cut off vital
food and information to such groups, the tactic is considered
lawful. See L. Oppenheim, supr note 137 at 415.
213 2 L. Oppenheim, supr note 137 at 416.
214 The Hostage Case (United States v. List. et. al),
(1949), U.S. Mil. Trib. Nuremberg, Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council
Law No.10, XI (1950) (Hereinafter cited as Trials of War
Criminals.)
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defended his scorched earth policy on the basis of military
necessity. In acquitting the defendant on that charge, the
Tribunal, after quoting Article 23(g) of the Hague IV
Regulations, went on to state:
The destruction of public and private
property by retreating military forces
which would give aid and comfort to the
enemy may constitute a situation coming
within the exceptions contained in
Article 23(g)... It is our considered
opinion that the conditions, as they
appeared to the defendant at the time
were sufficient upon which he could
honestly conclude that urgent military
necessity warranted the decision made.
This being true, he may have erred in the
exercise of his judgment15 but he was
guilty of no criminal act.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions did nothing to change the
law regarding a scorched earth policy. In fact, a delegate
215 Id. at 1296-7.
General Rendulic was retreating into Norway under
attack from high quality Soviet forces. The scorched earth
policy at issue involved evacuation of 43,000 people from
Finnmark during the Arctic winter. All domestic animals and
other food supplies were removed. German troops destroyed
whole villages, as well as communication and transportation
facilities. All of this was done to deny the advancing
Russian forces critical shelter from the cold (tents being
inadequate for this purpose). Removal of the population would
also ensure the Soviets would gain no intelligence information
on German movements.
Evacuees were permitted to take what baggage they
could carry but their dwellings were subsequently destroyed.
The Germans provided transportation to all people unable to
walk, as well as provisions for temporary shelter, food and
medical care. Although the indictment had alleged that
hundreds of evacuees died from exposure, the Court found no
evidence that anyone had been killed due to the evacuation.
Id. at 1295-6.
A similar decision was made by the Court concerning
measures of general devastation taken by certain German
generals in Russia. See High Command Trial (William von Leeb
e._ ., (1948), Trials of War Criminals, Id. at Vol. VIII.
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from the International Committee of the Red Cross specifically
pointed out during the drafting process that GC Article 53
would not make such a policy illegal.
216
B. Iraqi Oil Spill and Oil Well Fires as a
Scorched-Earth Tactic
If a scorched-earth policy can under certain
circumstances be legal, could the igniting of the oil wells or
the spilling of oil in the Gulf by the Iraqis have been
justified under this theory? As outlined above, the answer is
only if it was militarily necessary to do so. Certainly, if
the Iraqis were intending to retreat, they could have lawfully
destroyed ammunition, weapons and provisions they could not
217
take with them. That would logically include any refined
petroleum products readily usable as fuel by the advancing
Coalition forces. Crude oil in the ground, which with
considerable effort and time could eventually become usable by
advancing coalition forces, is not analogous to readily usable
munitions and provisions.218  Crude oil is more analogous to
forest timber and coal mines, which historically have been
216 G. von Glahn, supra note 149 at 228.
217 L. Oppenheim, sura note 137 at 228.
218 To a limited extent the Iraqis had used or attempted
to use crude oil as a flame weapon. They had placed it in
trenches as part of their fixed defensive barriers, and had
poured it on roads, in both instances hoping to ignite it when
an attack occurred. While such limited uses would qualify
crude oil as a "weapon", that is not what is involved in the
oil spill or oil well fires.
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considered not to be eligible for lawful destruction by
retreating forces.
219
Unlike the Germans under General Rendulic, who were
creating an effective barrier in the harsh Arctic winter to
deprive pursuing Soviet troops with critical shelter and
intelligence, the Iraqis were creating no impediment to
advancing Coalition ground forces or maritime forces. In
fact, no evidence suggests that the Iraqis were preparing to
retreat in the days leading up to the Coalition ground
offensive. Given all these considerations, it seems clear
that the attacks on the oil wells were acts of vandalism aimed
at causing long-lasting damage to the occupied Kuwaiti
territory. Such an attack cannot be justified as militarily
necessary as part of a scorched earth policy.
220
219 L. Oppenheim, supra note 137 at 414. ( The German
retreat through the Somme area in the spring of 1917 included
destruction of these resources and was considered not
justified by military necessity.)
220 M. Greenspan, supra note 149 at 286.
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IX. 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War
of Asphyxiating, Poiapnous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods
The 1925 Gas Protocol's broad language in defining what
types of weapons it prohibits and the fact that Iraq is a
party to it make it worth considering if the oil "weapon"
might fall within its restrictions. As will now be developed,
crude oil does not fall within the restrictions established in
this widely adopted treaty.
A. Provisions and Overview of the Convention
The Protocol prohibits "... the use in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous
liquids, materials or devices.., and the use of
bacteriological methods of warfare..."222 Surprisingly, the
Protocol itself does not define further the basic operative
terms. As a result, much ink has been spilled by
international lawyers attempting to further specify the types
of weapons prohibited by this treaty. Included among these
have been imaginative arguments that the Convention makes
illegal the use of nuclear weapons because of the long lasting
221 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, Jun. 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S.




and severe effects of radiation.223  Even the U.N. General
Assembly has sought to define the weapons prohibited, but
without legal effect.
224
223 A. Roberts and R. Guelff, supra note 147 at 139.
224 In 1969, the U.N. General assembly further defined
these terms. The Resolution states in pertinent part:
The General Assembly,
... Declares as contrary to the generally
recognized rules of international law, as
embodied in the Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June
1925, the use in international armed
conflicts of:
(a) Any chemical agents of warfare-
chemical substances, whether gaseous,
liquid or solid- which might be employed
because of their direct toxic effects on
man, animals or plants;
(b) Any biological agents of warfare-
living organisms, whatever their nature,
or infective material derived from them-
which are intended to cause disease or
death in man, animals or plants, and
which depend for their effects on the
ability to multiply in the person, animal
or plant attacked.
Questions of Chemical and Bacteriological
(Biological) Weapons, G.A. Res. 2603A, Dec. 16,
1969, reprinted in D. Djonovich, supra note 159
at Vol. XII, 226.
Although U.N. General Assembly Resolutions do not
create international law, they can nonetheless reflect state
practice, which is one of the elements in the formation of
customary law. In this case, the vote was insufficient to
suggest that the Resolution evidences a customary norm.
The vote on the Resolution was 80-3-36. The U.S.,
Australia and Portugal voted against it. Included among the
states voting to abstain were China, France and the U.K. Both
the number of abstentions and the almost uniform absence of
support among permanent members of the Security Council
suggests the Resolution is not reflective of state practice.
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B. Application to the Oil Spill and Oil Well Fires
It would be a far stretch indeed to make crude oil out to
be either a "chemical" or "biological" weapon. The accepted
approach for interpreting a treaty is to apply the ordinary
meaning of the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of the treaty's object and purpose.225  Chemical and
biological agents are man-altered substances. Both are
specifically designed for use as weapons. Both are intended
to have acute rather than chronic effects on the enemy
personnel or area exposed to them. Crude oil meets none of
these characteristics: It occurs naturally and is widely used
as an energy source. While the use of crude oil-based
products results in adverse human health and ecosystem
effects, that alone can't reasonably be argued to justify
their inclusion among things prohibited by the 1925 Gas
Protocol.
225 Vienna Convention supr note 122 at Art. 31.
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X. 1977 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Othi- Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques
Drafted in response to perceived excesses in the creation
of environmental damage by the U.S. during the Vietnam War,
the ENMOD Convention prohibits the use of environmental
modification techniques in warfare. A number of international
law and environmental law attorneys have leapt to the
conclusion that the Iraq's oil weapon constituted such a
technique and that Iraq, as a signatory to the Convention, had
violated its restrictions.227  In fact, a more careful
analysis will demonstrate that the ENMOD Convention does not
apply to the Sea Island Terminal oil release or the oil well
fires.
A. Provisions & Interpretation
The ENMOD Treaty was negotiated under the auspices of the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with all 30 member
states participating. In 1976 a revised text of the proposed
Convention was transmitted to the U.N. General Assembly along
226 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques,
May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. 9614, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151
[Hereinafter ENMOD Convention].
227 Among them were Joel Burcat, general counsel,
National Wildlife Institute. See SORE, supra note 192.
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with a set of Understandings. At the heart of the
Convention are the following provisions:
Article I: 1. Each State Party to this
Convention undertakes not to engage in
military or any other hostile use of
environmental modification techniques
having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects as the means of destruction,
damage or injury to any other state
party.
Article II: As used in Article I, the
term ' environmental modification
techniques' refers to any technique for
changing- through the deliberate
manipulation of natural processes- the
dynamics, composition or structure of the
Earth, including its biota, lithosphere,
hydrospere and atmosphere, or of outer
space.
The Understandings which accompanied the final draft of the
ENMOD Convention are critical in applying the Convention to
the oil spill and oil well fires. There are several reasons
for this.
First, they clarify the operative terms "widespread",
"long-lasting" and "severe", making it clear that in order for
an environmental modification technique to be prohibited, its
effects must last several months, cover several hundred square
kilometers and cause seriolis or significant disruption or harm
228 A. Roberts and R. Guelff, supra note 147 at 379.




to human life or natural or economic resources.
Second, the Understandings explain that the above terms
are defined exclusively for the purpose of understanding the
ENMOD Convention. Thi-s point is important because it
highlights the fact that the drafters recognized there was a
fundamental difference in purpose between the ENMOD Convention
and the 1977 Geneva Protocol I provisions being nego '-ted
during the same period. Protocol I also contained provisions
231
regarding the environment in an armed conflict. The
drafters were aware that the ENMOD Convention was concerned
with a party using the Earth's natural forces as weapons
whereas the 1977 Geneva Protocol had the broader purpose of
limiting damage to the environment in an armed conflict,
regardless of the weapon used.
Third, the Understandings help clarify the object and
purpose of the Convention by providing a non-exhaustive list
of phenomena qualifying as "dynamics, composition or structure
of the Earth", which the drafters felt could result from
manipulating the forces of the environment.
232
230 1976 Understandings Related to Article I of the
Environmental Convention, Special Report on the Question of a
Convention to Prohibit Environmental Warfare, 31 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 27) 61, U.N. Doc. A/31/27 (1976) redacted in A.
Roberts and R. Guelff, supra note 147 at 377.)
231 A. Roberts and R. Guelff, supra n-te 147 at 378.
(The 1977 Geneva Protocol I also uses the terms "widespread",
"long-lasting" and "severe".)
232 Id. (Those listed were: earthquakes, tsunamis, an
upset in the ecological balance of a region, changes in
weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various
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B. Application to the Oil Spill & Oil Well Fires
A study of the operative phrases of the Convention in
light of the Understandings of the drafters shows that the
object and purpose of the Convention was to prohibit the
turning of one of Earth's natural processes into a destructive
force to be used against another Party. The ENMOD Convention
therefore does not provide general protection of the
233
environment from damage during armed conflict. If it can
be accepted that the Iraqis intended to use the oil spill
during hostile military operations as outlined above, then it
is true that the Gulf currents were used to transport the
crude oil toward the intended beach and desalinization plant
targets. Similarly, if it can be said that the Iraqis
intended the setting of oil well fires to provide smoke cover
for its military forces, it is also true that the Iraqis
relied on the natural force of the wind to blow the resulting
smoke over its forces.
These limited uses can't reasonably be said to be what
the drafters of the Convention meant by "environmental
types, and tornadic storms), changes in climate patterns,
changes in ocean current, changes in the state of the ozone
layer, and changes in the state of the ionosphere.)
233 One aspect of this limited protection is the extent
of the environment covered. Article I specifies that the
destruction, damage or injury covered extends only to areas
within the jurisdiction of other state parties. Damage done
by environmental modification techniques to the environment in
areas such as the high seas and all areas under the
jurisdiction of non-parties is not prohibited by the
Convention.
93
modification techniques" since they are not in*tended to change
the "dynamics, composition or structure of the earth". The
Iraqis weren't changing the ocean currents or the wind. They
were only using them as a means of transport in delivering
,~234their oil "weapon".
It is true that if the Sea Island Terminal oil spill is
an environmental modification technique, then the resulting
damage falls within one of the qualifying phenomena as "an
upset in the ecological balance". Theoretically, the smoke
resulting from the oil well fires could have changed the
weather and climate patterns in Asia, thereby falling within
235
that qualifying phenomena. But the ENMOD Convention
prohibits only use of natural processes as a weapon, and not
234 The oil well fires do appear to be altering the
weather, at least locally within Kuwait. The tremendous heat
generated from the fires has created fierce winds at the edge
of the oil fields. Measurements taken by the Kuwaitis in May,
1991 and compared to measurements taken 12 months earlier show
a 30% decrease in solar radiation, a 40% decrease in
ultraviolet light and a 20% increase in humidity. The soot
from the fires may also be seeding the skies and forming rain
clouds. See Booth, Kuwait May Evacuate Smoke-Filled Areas,
Wash. Post, May 21, 1991 at A12.
If these effects turn out to be widespread, lasting
and severe, they probably constitute "dynamics, composition or
structure of the earth" as referred to in Article II since
they are arguably "changes in weather and climate patterns" as
mentioned in the definition provided in the Understandings.
Nonetheless, the Convention only prohibits changing the
dynamics, composition or structure of the earth throuah the
deliberate manipulation of natural processes. The igniting of
oil wells is not an environmental modification technique
because it is not a technique which involves the deliberate
manipulation of a natural process. Oil extraction is not a
natural process nor is the ignition of the oil being
extracted.
235 Infra note 232.
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environmental damage in general.236 Indeed, if the ENMOD
Convention's purpose was to provide general protection of the
environment, why were the extensive environmental provisions
placed in the 1977 Geneva Protocol I? Such provisions would
have only been redundant. The ENMOD Convention, by its own
terms, does not apply to the Iraqi oil spill or oil well
sabotage.
C. Extent To Which Iraq Is Bound By the Convention
Even if the terms of the ENMOD Convention could be said
to apply to the Iraqi actions, there remains the issue of
whether Iraq is bound by the Convention. Although Iraq signed
the Convention in 1977 and the Convention entered into force
in 1979, Iraq has never become a party to it. Unless a treaty
reflects some international customary norm, it creates law for
the contracting parties only.237 Hence, it cannot be enforced
238
against states who do not become a party to it. A state
choosing to sign a treaty is not bound to become a party to
239
that treaty, and may withhold ratification for any reason.
Iraq was therefore not bound by the ENMOD Convention, when it
236 Almond, Weapons. War and the Environment, 3 Geo.
Envtl. L. Rev. 149 (1990).
237 L. Oppenheim, s note 137 at 28.
238 C. Rhyne, International Law 49 (1971).
239 Rogoff, s note 124 at 267.
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chose to spill crude oil in the Gulf and to set fire to
Kuwait's oil wells.
Iraq was under the customary international law oLligation
not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty which it has
signed or ratified but which has not yet entered into
240
force. Those who argue that the ENMOD Convention applies
to the oil spill and oil well fires also argue that Iraq has
therefore violated its duty as a signatory state. That
argument ignores the limited nature of the duty, which is only
to refrain from acts which would make it impossible to comply
with the provisions of the treaty once it enters into force.
While reprehensible, Iraq's conduct in polluting the Gulf with
crude oil and setting fire to Kuwait's oil wells will not
prevent it from later ratifying the ENMOD Convention and
thereafter refraining from using environmental modification
techniques for hostile purposes.
It should also be mentioned that the ENMOD Treaty does
not reflect any customary international law norms. It was new
law when it opened for signature in 1976 and by 1990 had 54
241
parties to it. The absence of some of the major military
powers and lack of widespread support for the Convention are
indications that it has not yet achieved customary law status
240 See the discussion of this norm in subsection
IV(A)(4)(a) of this paper at page 42.
241 2 Kuwait, the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. are all
parties to it. Iraq(though a signatory since 1977), Saudi
Arabia, Iran, France and China are not parties.
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and could not be applied to Iraq even if its substance could
242
be said to do so.
XI. Conclusions Regarding Iraqi Liability Under the Law of
Armed Conflict
The spilling of a large quantity of crude oil in the
Persian Gulf and the igniting of over 500 oil well fires by
Iraq were violations of the international law of armed
conflict. These acts violated customary international law as
evidenced by Articles 23(g) and Art. 55 of the Hague IV
Regulations. These acts also violated Iraq's duty as a party
to the GC not to destroy public property absent military
necessity. Inasmuch as the GC has itself now become
customary international law, Iraq would have been bound to
comply regardless of its status as a party. However, as is so
often the case in international law, the conclusion of state
responsibility for violations of treaties and customary norms
brings only the possibility of a legal beginning.
Part Three: Considerations for Enforcing International Law
With Regard to the Iraqi Oil "Weapon"
242 North Sea Cases, supra note 73.
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XII. Holding Iraq Accountable
A. Keeping a Sense of Perspective
What should be done about Iraq's violations? A good
place to start in answering this question is to consider the
extent of air and water pollution currently tolerated within
the world community. In truth, despite a growing
acknowledgment of the negative consequences, most nations
permit extensive pollution to occur within tteir borders,
often with significant adverse consequences to other states.
A comparison between what the world community permits to occur
in peacetime and what Iraq has been responsible for in the
1991 Gulf War is instructive in assessing the propriety of
specific remedies.
Globally, one-fifth of the world's population breathes
air containing more pollutants than recommended by the World
243
Health Organization. In the United States, despite twenty
years of increasingly restrictive federal pollution control
legislation, Americans still intentionally release over 134
244
million tons of pollutants into the air each year. By one
estimate, had the Kuwaiti oil well fires burned for a year,
they would have released only 26 million tons of air
243 J. Morris, Environment: Major Concerns, 1991
Britannica Book of the Year 193 (1991).
244 Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental
Quality. 21st Annual Report, Table 39, pg. 322. (This figure
measures only the six criteria pollutants.)
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pollutants. From an environmental perspective, there is
no difference between a ton of sulfur dioxide released legally
into the air from commuter vehicles in Washington D.C. and a
ton released as a result of Iraq's illegal damage to the
Kuwaiti oil fields. The resulting damage to the world
ecosystem is the same.
In the United States, the E.P.A. estimates that Americans
intentionally dump 5 to 7 million barrels of used motor oil
from do-it-yourself automotive oil changes into the ground or
246
sewer systems in a year. The Iraqi intentional oil spill
at Sea Island Terminal of up to 3 million barrels seems
moderate in comparison.
Many nations are responsible for trans-boundary pollution
that adversely effects the territory of other nations. The
U.S. has for decades sent acid rain to Canada from large
electric utility plants in the Mid-West. The Soviet Union has
yet to accept responsibility for the damage caused in Europe
from radiation released at Chernobyl in 1986. Brazil has for
years ignored the massive deforestation of the Amazon with its
impact on global warming. While Iraq's unnecessary
destruction of Kuwaiti oil resources needs to be condemned by
the world community, this should be done with a sober
understanding of the long-standing state practice of
245 Weisskopf, spra note 13 at A25.
246 J. Nolan, Reuulating Recycled Used Oil: EPA's
Mission Impossible, The Environmental Forum, July/August 1989
at 15.)
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environmental degradation both within national borders and
across them.
247
In fashioning an appropriate international law response
to Iraq's illegal oil spill and oil well sabotage,
consideration also needs to be given to the seriousness of
these violations relative to the other breaches committed by
Iraq in its invasion of Kuwait. The invasion itself is a
248
clear crime against peace. It was subsequently followed
247 One author has nonetheless argued that a consensus
regarding environmental protection has emerged among the
states of the world community. In support of this assertion,
he cites the domestic environmental activities of the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. as evidence of a general practice against
polluting the environment. See Schafer, The Relationship
Between the International LaW of Armed Conflict and
Environmental Protection: The Need to Reevaluate What Types of
Conduct Are Permissible During Hostilities, 19 Cal. W. Int'l
L.J. 291-6 (1989).
While there has been a movement for states to
promise environmental protection in a number of treaties and
conferences, action to effect these promises has largely yet
to emerge. In light of numerous accounts of environmental
degradation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, MAJ
Shafer's enthusiastic reference to the U.S.S.R.'s creation of
some of the strictest environmental laws in the world as proof
of concern for the environment is remarkable. See Mathews,
The Union of Soviet Socialist Pollution, Wash. Post, Apr. 12,
1991 at A16. See also Meyer, Pullout of the Barbarians,
Newsweek, June 10, 1991 at 36. (The Czechoslovakians
calculate the Soviets have done $70 million worth of
environmental damage to their country during the course of
their military occupation, through indiscriminate dumping of
fuel and hazardous waste.)
248 The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal stated in
pertinent part:
The following acts, or any of them, are
crimes coming within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal for which there shall be
individual responsibility:
(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely,
planning, preparation, initiation, or
100
by brutally excessive measures to repress the underground
resistance movement including torture and punishment without
trial in violation of the CC. The Iraqi government organized
a thorough program for seizing both public and private
property for removal to Iraq in violation of the CC. It also
failed to enforce laws against pillage resulting in wide-
spread abuses by individual Iraqi soldiers. The intentional
targeting of population centers with Scud missiles, and use of
treacherous ruses involving feigned surrender were also
regular occurrences.
Beyond Iraq's immediate behavior during the war itself is
a record of systematic atrocities committed against its own
249
rebellious Kurdish minority. It is sobering to note that
despite the supposed universal nature of the crime of genocide
under international law, no strong movement has emerged in the
United Nations or elsewhere to pursue prosecution of those
waging of a war of aggression, or a war
in violation of international treaties,
agreements, or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishments of the
foregoing...
Charter of the Nuremburg Tribunal,
Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis (London Charter), Aug. 8,
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
249 See Nordland, Saddam's Secret War, June 10, 1991,
Newsweek at 28. ( The author outlines the growing body of
evidence that the Iraqis destroyed at least 3,000 Kurdish
villages between 1988 and 1990. The destruction of each
village was typically preceded by chemical bombing and
sometimes followed by the rounding up of adult male survivors,
none of whom would ever be seen again.)
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Iraqis responsible.250  Considering the widespread human
suffering perpetrated by the Iraqis on Kuwait, the damage done
to the enviomt, while illegal and reprehensible, is of
lesser significance. Priority should reasonably be given to
ensure that a precedent under international law is first
established to hold Iraq accountable for the human suffering.
B. Fashioning an Appropriate International Law Remedy
Once a war has been concluded, three methods remain
available to enforce the laws of armed conflict: 1)
prosecution of suspected war criminals by international courts
or by national courts other than those of the offending state;
2) protests to the offending state coupled with a demand for
prosecution of those persons suspected; or 3) protests to the
offending state coupled with a demand for compensation for the
injuries suffered. Although after the fact, such efforts are
necessary to validate and affirm the commitment of nations to
the agreed-upon laws of armed conflict. For the reasons
outlined below, the best and most practical approach to the
numerous Iraqi violations (including the oil "weapon") would
be the payment of reparations by Iraq tied to a statement
250 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. (As of
1990, there were 99 states who were parties to the Convention,
which makes it a crime to kill, seriously injure or inflict
conditions of life upon members of an ethnic group with intent
to destroy them in whole or in part.)
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acknowledging responsibility for the violations.
The U.S. and its Coalition partners wisely chose not to
continue hostilities in order to occupy all of Iraq. At the
same time, the Iraqi people were subsequently unable and
perhaps unwilling to end the government of President Saddam
Hussein and his Baath Party. As a result of these two events,
the government responsible for most of the war crimes
committed remains in power. Given that reality, the war
crimes trials option has little chance of success.
1. The War Crimes Trials Option
a. Background
Although a complete survey of the history of the use of
war crimes trials is unnecessary for the purposes of this
paper, a brief overview is helpful in understanding some of
the limitations involved with them.251  Enforcement of the
laws of armed conflict by criminalizing violations was rare
prior to the First World War. When trials were held, they
were almost exclusively by means of national courts rather
251 2 For a thorough review of war crimes penal clauses in
treaties as well as the trials emerging from World War II, see
Sandoz, Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law in 1
International Criminal Law 209 ( M. Bassiouni ed., 1986).
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than an international criminal justice system.252  Although
the belligerents concluded at the end of World War I that the
Kaiser would be prosecuted for war crimes by an international
tribunal and that Germany would hand over for trial by Allied
military tribunals service men accused of war crimes, neither
of these prosecutions actually took place.253 Having the
advantage of achieving total victory over the Axis powers at
the end of World War II, the Allies prosecuted suspected Axis
war criminals both in international trials ( the International
Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo) and in national trials using
military tribunals in their respective zones of
254
occupation. The thousands of trials held under this
system established a clear precedent for prosecuting war
criminals before either national or international courts.
b. Prosecution Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions
The four Geneva Conventions concluded in 1949 established
252 Bassiouni, Repression of Breaches of the Geneva
Conventions Under the Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, 8 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 189 (1977).
253 Id . at 190. (The Kaiser fled to the Netherlands,
which subsequently refused extradition based upon the
political offense exception. The Allies initially identified
896 suspected war criminals, but eventually agreed to permit
Germany to conduct the trials and insisted on the prosecution
of only 45 individuals. Germany actually tried 12, with the
six convicted receiving only nominal sentences.)
254. I.L at 191-2.
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for the first time in an international agreement an
enforcement scheme that criminalized individual behavior that
255
violated the laws of armed conflict. Entering into force
in 1950, by 1990 the 1949 Geneva Conventions had 166 nations
as parties to them. Common to all four Conventions are
articles regarding the repression of violations of the
treaties. Since the Iraqi violations discussed in this paper
were of the GC only, reference will henceforth be only to the
pertinent articles contained in the GC.
The GC adopts an indirect enforcement scheme in the
prosecution of those suspected of violating its provisions.
It commits each Party to enact national criminal laws against
violating those of its provisions enumerated as grave
256
breaches. Implied in this obligation is that such laws
255
The four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 are:
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No.3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No.3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [Hereinafter GPWJ; GC, suRa note 148.
256 Article 146 states:
The High Contracting Parties undertake
to enact any legislation necessary to
provide effective penal sanctions for
persons committing, or ordering to be
committed, any of the grave breaches of
the present Convention defined in the
following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be
under an obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, such grave
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will extend to any person, including non-nationals of the
enacting state, who commits a grave breach.257 Each party is
also then committed to search for persons suspected of grave
breaches and thereafter to either prosecute them in its own
courts or extradite them to another Party state for trial.
25
While the GC provides only for prosecutions in national
courts, grave breaches are international crimes and are also
punishable by an international criminal court.259  It is
therefore permissible for a Party to the GC to hand over a
breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before
its own courts. It may also, if it
prefers, and in accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, hand
such persons over for trial to another
High Contracting Party concerned,
provided such High Contracting Party has
made out a prima facia case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take
measures necessary for the suppression of
all acts contrary to the provisions of
the present Convention other than the
grave breaches defined in the following
Article.
In all circumstances, the accused
persons shall benefit by safeguards of
proper trial and defence, which shall not
be less favorable than those provided by
Article 105 and those following of the
Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August
12, 1949.
GC, sur note 148 at Art. 147.
257 2 J. Pictet, 0. Uhler, H. Coursier, F. Siordet, C.
Pilloud, R. Boppe, R.-J. Wilhelm, J.-P. Schoenholzer,
Commentary IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (1958) [Hereinafter Pictet].
258 GC, Art. 146(2) infra at note 256.
259 Bassiouni, supra note 252 at 196.
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person suspected of committing a grave breach to an
international criminal court whose competence has been
recognized by the Parties.
260
It should be noted that while the Parties are obliged to
suppress all violations of the GC, they are only obligated to
search for and either extradite or prosecute those suspected
261
of committing grave breaches. While violations of the GC
not falling among the enumerated grave breaches may be
suppressed by Parties through their criminal courts, they are
not considered international crimes.262  It should also be
noted that many war crimes do not violate the 1949 Geneva
Conventions at all, but nonetheless are serious crimes under
customary law. Such crimes would be punishable solely through
national courts.
263
Since much of the application of the GC enforcement
provisions depends upon whether or not a violation falls
within the category of grave breaches, application of the GC
enforcement provisions to the Iraqi oil spill and oil well
fires first requires a determination of whether or not these
constituted grave breaches. Of the grave breaches enumerated
260 Pictet, supra note 257 at 593.
261 GC, Art. 146(2)(3) infra note 256.
262 2 Bassiouni, spra note 252 at 196. See also Sandoz,
supra note 250 at 225.
263 Murphy, Sanctions and Enforcement of the
Humanitarian Law of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Geneva Protocol of 1977, 103 Mil. L. Rev. 43 (1984).
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by the GC, the oil spill and oil well fires fall within the
category of "...acts... committed against.. .property protected
by the present Convention: ... extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. '1264  As was
concluded earlier, GC Art. 53 protected Kuwaiti oil (owned by
the Kuwaiti state) and Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian coastal and
territorial sea property affected by that oil from destruction
by the Iraqis unless the destruction was rendered absolutely
265
necessary by military operations. This is the starting
point for considering the numerous difficulties which will be
encountered in an attempt to hold war crimes trials.
The meaning of the adjectives "extensive", "unlawful" and
"wanton" are first of all open to debate. While they
reasonably should apply to the loss of the millions of barrels
of oil poured into the Gulf and burned at the well head and
the loss of marine life and wildlife in coastal and
territorial sea areas, Iraq may well argue that they don't and
that no grave breaches have therefore occurred. The argument,
if successful, would then relieve Iraq of almost all its
duties under the GC. It would not be required to seek out
264 GC, suRa note 148 at Art. 147.
265 2 Infra at note 151.
The oil released from the tankers at Mina al Ahmadi
was Iraq's own property. As such, they were free to destroy
it if they wished. However, the damage resulting from its
release to Kuwaiti and Saudi property violates GC Art. 53.
See infra at VII(E), page 68. Prosecution solely under the
concept of military necessity would be unprecedented.
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those who destroyed or ordered the destruction of the oil at
Sea Island Terminal and at the oil wells, nor would it be
required to either prosecute or extradite them.
Secondly, although the U.S. had a war crimes
documentation team in place early on in the conflict, it is
probable that the Coalition has not identified all those
responsible for destroying and ordering the destruction of the
Kuwaiti oil.266  While Coalition nations might at first
appear to be able to use the mandatory inquiry provision of
the GC to identify those responsible, a closer reading makes
267
it clear that Iraq would be able to block such a process.
The GC specifies that the procedure for conducting the
enquiry must first be agreed upon between Iraq and the
266
The Coalition is apparently in possession of written
orders to Iraqi Corps commanders instructing them on January
17, 1991 to destroy the oil fields in the event of a ground
war. See Atkinson and Claiborne, supra note 18.
Still, while higher officials may be easily
identifiable, identifying and locating the individual Iraqi
engineers responsible for exploding the wells and releasing
the oil will be much more difficult. See Isikoff, U.S.
Prepares for Possible War Crimes Trials, Wash. Post, Feb. 12,
1991 at A10.
267 The GC states in pertinent part:
At the request of a Party to the
Conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted,
in a manner to be decided between the
interested Parties, concerning any
alleged violation of the Convention.
If agreement has not been reached
concerning the procedure for the enquiry,
the Parties should agree on the choice of
an umpire who will decide upon the
procedure to be followed.
GC, supra note 148 at Art. 149.
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requesting party. While the Convention goes on to provide
that an umpire will decide upon the procedure in the event the
parties are unable to agree, it does not specify who will act
as umpire nor what is to happen if the parties can't mutually
agree upon one. Even if an enquiry were undertaken, Iraq
would have ample time to destroy or even fabricate evidence in
order to protect many of those responsible.
Thirdly, Iraq might choose to concede the point that the
oil well fires and oil release were grave breaches. It would
still be free to follow Germany's example after World War I,
wearing down the Allies over time, delaying the prosecution of
those responsible and eventually holding only a token number
of trials resulting in acquittal or nominal punishment. After
all, the GC requires only that Iraq bring persons suspected of
grave breaches "before its own courts", with no specific
obligation to vigorously prosecute them.
Fourth, as Professor Howard Levie recently reminded an
audience at an ABA-sponsored seminar on international law and
the 1991 Gulf War, "Before you can make rabbit stew, you have
to catch a rabbit". If other nations demand that Iraq fulfill
its obligation to extradite war crimes suspects it chooses not
to prosecute, Iraq may easily find legal arguments to justify
a decision not to do so. The GC requires Iraq to extradite
suspects to another Party state requesting it only "in
accordance with the provisions of its own legislation..." and
"provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima
110
facie case". 2 Iraq may easily claim that the requesting
state has failed to make out a prima facia case against the
Iraqi suspect sought for extradition. In addition, depending
upon the requesting state involved, Iraq might refuse
extradition based upon a lack of an extradition treaty, the
269
political nature of the crime or for other reasons.
Even when an extradition treaty is in existence, there may
be several impediments built into the treaty itself. In the
case of the extradition treaty between Iraq and the U.S. for
example, the political crimes exception is included.
270
There is also a requirement that the suspect must have
committed a crime specifically enumerated in the treaty.
271
The enumerated crimes do not include violations of
international law or the destruction of public property.
272
Finally, the U.S.-Iraq extradition treaty, like most such
treaties, specifies that neither party is bound to deliver up
268 GC, Art. 146 infra at note 256.
269 Van Den Wijngaert, War Crimes. Crimes Aainst
Humanity and Statutory Limitations, in 3 International
Criminal Law 93 (M. Bassiouni ed., 1986).
270 Extradition Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Kingdom of Iraq, Jun. 7, 1934, 49 Stat. 3380,
170 L.N.T.S. 267 at Art. I.
271 Id. at Art. II(5).
272 The crimes listed do include arson, which arguably
may be said to involve the exploding of the Kuwaiti oil wells.




Some have called upon the U.S. to put pressure upon Iraq
to agree to extradite those suspected of war crimes.
Unsatisfied with the ambitious reparations plan adopted by the
Security Council, it had been suggested that if only the U.S.
really wanted to, it could somehow persuade Iraq to turn over
274
members of its own ruling elite for trial by the U.S. Yet
such persuasion would only effectively come at gunpoint, and
it would not be worth the additional American and other lives
lost in the ensuing "rabbit hunt" across Iraq. The Security
Council got as much as it possibly could from the Iraqis when
it got them to agree in principle to accept liability under
international law for reparations and by setting in place an
historic mechanism to achieve that agreement. After all, it
is one thing for Iraq to agree to pay a portion of future oil
dollars to its victims, but it is entirely another to expect
it turn over members of its own ruling elite for criminal
trial.
Although beyond the focus of this paper, there are
numerous foreign policy reasons for not pursuing war crimes
trials against Iraqis responsible for the oil well fires and
oil spill. These include reigniting the hatred of the
273 2 .Id. at Art. VIII. See also Pictet, spra note 256
at 593. (The Commentary suggests hopefully that given this
fact, the requested state is bound to prosecute the suspect
itself if it chooses to rely upon this provision.)
2742 Green, Thugs Who Sack Kuwait Deserve Harsh
Penalties, L.A. Daily Journal, Mar. 26, 1991 at 6.
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already sympathetic Arab masses throughout the Middle East and
parts of Africa, and providing the Iraqis with a forum for a
propaganda campaign to rewrite the history of the war. Given
the tremendous hurdles involved in bringing war crime suspects
to trial, it would be a better precedent to simply leave the
issue open then to try and fail, as was done in World War
1.275 But what if the U.S. were able to bring some of those
responsible to trial? Would the results necessarily be a
foregone conclusion?
c. Procedural Difficulties in War Crimes Trials
The GC requires that persons accused of violations of the
Convention be afforded the safeguards of a proper trial and
275 U.S. Secretary of State Baker has suggested that
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would "be best equipped to take the
lead" in prosecuting war criminals. They have in custody some
individual who are suspected of war crimes, and would have the
best access, short of Iraq itself, to evidence concerning the
oil well fires and oil spill. See Hoffman, U.S.: No Plans to
Try Saddam In Absentia, Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 1991 at A23.
Still, Kuwait was internationally discredited from
playing this role after holdin" a number of trials of alleged
Iraqi collaborators under mart. kl law. The accused were not
permitted to see their counsel before trial, and counsel were
not permitted to cross-examine witnesses or even see the
evidence or charges in the case. See Hoffman, Bush Urges
Kuwait to Ensure Fair Trials, Wash. Post, May 21, 1991 at Al.
Given this experience, it is probably better for
the development of international law that no trials take place
than to hold some that would quickly be labeled as "victor's
justice".
Ironically, failure to afford a person protected
under the 1949 Geneva Conventions with a fair and regular
trial is itself a grave breach of the Conventions. See GC,
supra note 148 at Art. 147.
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defense, which it defines as including the procedural
protections laid out for prisoners of war in the GPW who are
tried for violations of the laws of the detaining ration
276
during his or her captivity. Those protections include an
opportunity to present a defense, the assistance of a
qualified counsel, and the right to call witnesses.
277
Most significant for Iraqi servicemen captured during the
war and tried for war crimes is a provision that requires they
be tried in the same courts as the detaining state's service
278
personnel and afforded the same procedural rights. This is
significant were the U.S. to try such service personnel
because it most probably requires that trial be by general
courts-martial, with its full array of procedural rights,
including the application of the rules of evidence. The
availability of the hearsay rule alone would cause the
government considerable trouble in mustering witnesses and
limiting its use of documentary evidence.
279
276 GC, Art. 146 infra note 256.
277 GPW, spra note 255 at Art. 99.
278 Id. at Art. 102. See also Dept. of the Army, FM 27-
10 The Law of Land Warfare 69 (1956).
279 Under Articles 18 and 21 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice ( 18 U.S.C. 818, 821), U.S. service personnel
and any other person who by the laws of war are subject to
trial may be tried by either general court-martial or by
military tribunals (such as military commissions and provost
courts). However, military tribunals have only been used
during occupations of belligerent territory, when other courts
are not open or functioning. See Law of Naval Operations,
supra note 55 at 6-38. See also U.S. Marine Corps, D
Law of War Course VIII-2 (1984). Given that the U.S. no
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preserve the Iraqi President in power longer.281 In addition
to the obvious political problems, such trials could be
roundly criticized for lacking the procedural safeguards
provided for by the GC.
d. Conclusion Regarding the War Crimes Trial Option
Although highly attractive to legal theorists and
politicians, war crimes trials in light of the decision not to
press for total victory over Iraq are simply not achievable.
Perhaps most telling about the war crimes trial enforcement
mechanism embodied in the 1949 Geneva Conventions is that it
has never been used in over forty years since the Conventions
were signed.282 This despite numerous conflicts in which the
Conventions should have applied. Even the International
Committee of the Red Cross has admitted that the system never
281 Hoffman, su ra note 275 at A23.
282 Law of Naval Operations, s note 55 at 6-37.
(While the U.S. and some others occasionally conduct
prosecutions for violations of the law of armed conflict,
these have been trials of their own forces for breaches of
military discipline rather than under the Geneva Convention
enforcement scheme.)
2932 Professor Bassiouni includes among these the Korean
Conflict, the Algerian War of Independence, the Indo-China War
of Independence, the Biafran Succession, the Vietnam Conflict,
the Arab-Israeli Wars and the Bangladesh Successions. See
Bassiouni, u note 252 at 194 n.70.
To these I would add the Libya-Chad War, the Iran-
Iraq War, the Falklands/Malvinas War, the Grenada Conflict,
the Panama Conflict, and now the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
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Even if the extraordinary decision were to be made to try
suspected Iraqi war criminals by military tribunal, the
President has signaled a preference to operate these in such
a manner as to afford the accused the same procedural
protections provided by courts-martial.28 Whatever the
final choice of forum, as the government found in the My Lai
massacre cases, martialling witnesses and other evidence from
a battlefield half a world away can be an almost
insurmountable task.
Some have suggested that suspected Iraqi war criminals,
particularly President Saddam Hussein, be tried in absentia.
Of course, with no opposing party to object, the burden of
producing evidence at such trials would be considerably
reduced. Yet, such trials would be readily seen more as a
media event staged to discredit Saddam than as a serious
effort to enforce the laws of armed conflict. Such trials
would only reenforce the perception of the impotence of
international law in this area. The U.S. has come out
against such an effort, concluding that it might actually help
longer occupies Iraqi territory in a belligerent capacity,
military tribunals would not be authorized.
280. The Manual for Courts-Martial, prescribed by the
President, states in pertinent part: "Subject to any
applicable rule of international law or to any regulations
prescribed by the President or by other competent authority,
military commissions and provost courts shall be guided by the
appropriate principles of law and rules of procedure and
evidence prescribed for courts-martial." See
Courts-Martial. United States, 1984, at Part I:Preamble,
(2)(b)(2).
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worked.284  While sounding good in sound-bites and op-ed
articles, the war crimes trials option has wisely been left
open but as of yet unused.
285
2. The Reparations Option
a. Background
Reparations are payments (usually in money) made by a
losing belligerent nation to a victorious one. They have
historically served two purposes. First, reparations may be
compensation paid in recognition of the losing state's
responsibility for causing the war. This was the case for
Germany at the end of World Wars I and II. But reparations
may also be payments made for violating the laws of armed
conflict as well as international environmental law.
286
The idea to use money damages as an enforcement mechanism
against nations which violated the laws of armed conflict was
first incorporated into the Hague IV Convention. Up until
then, the assumption had simply been that nations, like
284 Van Den -Wijngaert, supra note 269 at 90.
285 Not least of the political reasons that war crimes
trials will not be held is the glass-house problem. There
have been consistent reports that Kuwaiti troops violated the
laws of armed conflict. 5@g Navy Probes Alleged Shooting of
Surrenderina Iraqi Troops, Wash. Post, June 12, 1991 at A29.
286 Sandoz, Unlawful Damage in Armed Conflicts and
Redress Under International Humanitarian Law, 228 Int'l Rev.
Red Cross 131, 143 (1982).
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gentlemen, always kept their promises, and that plodges made
in international treaties would be honored without the need
287
for any threat of sanctions for noncompliance. The
Convention provided that " A belligerent party which violates
the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case
demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of
its armed forces."'28 The provision was included, explained
the German delegate who proposed it, not because of any sudden
doubts about the good faith of governments, but because
compliance depended upon the behavior of the men in the armed
forces who would be engaged in a dangerous, intensely violent
struggle for life itself. Under these circumstances, it was
reasonable to assume that some violations would occur and that
some mechanism was needed to address these. Victims of
violations should logically be indemnified for their injury,
just as in civil law, persons whose rights were violated had
resulting damages paid for by those who caused them harm.
Given the difficulties in obtaining compensation through the
civil system from errant service men, the decision was made to
make the parent government responsible for their actions.
289
While this system had as its main purpose a compensation
program for victims, it had the collateral benefit of
287 I2 . at 136.
288 Hague IV, s note 147 at Art. 3.
289 Sandoz, s note 286 at 137.
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discouraging violations by creating adverse publicity for
offending nations and by causing payments to be made.
Building as it did upon already existing customary
international law prot_.cting non-combatants, the GC implicitly
recognized the availability of reparations as an enforcement
mechanism for law of armed conflict violations. The GC
therefore sought to strengthen the already existing
reparations mechanism. Traditionally under international law,
persons wronged by a foreign state could only seek redress
through their own national government, which would present a
claim on citizens behalf to the foreign state. Particularly
in the context of a citizen victimized by foreign military
forces during a conflict, this makes some sense given the fact
that the citizen is unlikely to have the means to identify the
individual foreign service personnel responsible or pursue a
claim in foreign courts.
29
In settling such claims, the states involved were free to
compromise the claim, even absolving the responsible state of
291
any liability for the wrong. There is therefore always
the danger that a citizen so victimized by another state will
have his claim compromised by his own country if it lost the
conflict by absolving the other state of responsibility for
violations of the laws of armed conflict committed upon the
claimant. This would eliminate the chance that reparations
290 Id. at 142.
291 Murphy, supra note 263 at 33.
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would be paid and passed on to the victim.
To prevent this, the GC provides that parties to the
Convention may not absolve themselves or other states from
292
liability arising from grave breaches of the Convention.
In addition to the use of reparations under the
international law of armed conflict, reparations are also
available for violations of international environmental law
since they are a normal remedy available when a state breaches
a treaty obligation owed to another state and causes injury
293
thereby. It would therefore be appropriate for a state
which is a party to the Kuwait Regional Convention to demand
reparations from Iraq for violating its duties under that
Convention.
b. Reparations Mechanism Provided by the
Security Council
In the months which followed the invasion of Kuwait, the
Security Council of the United Nations repeatedly reminded
Iraq of its obligations under the GC as well as international
law generally. In increasingly blunt terms, the Security
Council, through resolutions, outlined Iraq's responsibilities
and laid the groundwork for enforcing international law
292 G9 sC, r note 148 at Art. 148.
293 Chorzow Factory (Jurisdiction) Case, 1927 P.C.I.J.,
(ser. A.) No.9 (July 26) at 21.
120
294through reparations. Among these historic resolutions
The pertinent portions of the Security Council
Resolutions were as follows:
- it... Deeply Concerned for the safety and well being of
third state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait,
Recalling the obligations of Iraq in this regard under
international law.... "
S.C. Res. 664, Aug. 18, 1990, (S/RES/664 (1990).
- "..Deeply Concerned that Iraq has failed to comply
with its obligations under Security Council resolution 664
(1990) in respect of the safety and well-being of third state
nationals, and reaffirming that Iraq retains full
responsibility in this regard under international humanitarian
law including, where applicable, the Fourth Geneva
Convention,..."
S.C. Res. 666, Sept. 13, 1990, (S/RES/666 (1990).
- "... Condemning Further the treatment by Iraqi forces of
Kuwaiti nationals, including measures to force them to leave
their own country and mistreatment of persons and property in
Kuwait in violation of international law,..."
S.C. Res. 670, Sept. 25, 1990, (S/RES/670 (1990).
- "... CondemninQ the actions by the Iraqi authorities and
occupying forces to take third-state nationals hostage and to
mistreat and oppress Kuwaiti and third-state nationals, and to
other actions reported to the Council such as the destruction
of Kuwaiti demographic records, forced departure of Kuwaitis
and relocation of population in Kuwait and the unlawful
destruction and seizure of public and private property in
Kuwait including hospital supplies and equipment, in violation
of the decisions of this Council, the Charter of the United
Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic and Consular Relations and international law...
Reaffirmin that the Fourth Geneva Convention
applies to Kuwait and that as a High Contracting Party to the
Convention, Iraq is bound to comply fully with all its terms
and in particular is liable under the Convention in respect of
the grave breaches committed by it, as are individuals who
commit or order the commission of grave breaches, ...
1. Demands that Iraqi authorities and occupying
forces immediately cease and desist from ... actions such as
those reported to the Council and described above,
violating.., the Fourth Geneva Convention... and international
law;
2. Invites states to collect substantiated
information in their possession or submitted to them on the
grave breaches by Iraq as per paragraph 1 above and to make
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were specific references to Iraq's obligations not to
unlawfully destroy public property in Kuwait and its liability
for any loss, damage or injury resulting from the
295
invasion.
Following the suspension of offensive military operations
against Iraq by Coalition forces. the Security Council
demanded, among other things, that Iraq "accept in principle
its liability under international law for any loss, damage or
injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their
nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and
illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;... 1296 Having
previously agreed to comply fully with the Council's prior
resolutions, and fearful of a total occupation of Iraq by
poised Coalition forces, Iraq quickly agreed.
One month later, the Security Council followed-up and
announced the creation of an unprecedented international
system for indemnifying the victims of Iraq's international
this information available to the Council; ...
8. Reminds Iraq that under international law it is
liable for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to
Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and corporations,
as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait
by Iraq;
9. Invites states to collect relevant information
regarding their claims, and those of their nationals and
corporations, for restitution or financial compensation by
Iraq with a view to such arrangements as may be established in
accordance with international law;..."
S.C. Res. 674, Oct. 29, 1990, (S/RES/674(1990).
295 Id., S.C. Res. 674.
296 S.C. Res. 686, Mar. 2. 1991, (S/RES/686(1991)).
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law violations, including the laws of armed conflict and
international environmental law. The Council began by making
its broadest and most explicit statement up to that point
concerning the extent of Iraqi liability to pay reparations:
The Security Council,...
16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without
prejudice to the debts and obligations of
Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990,
which will be addressed through the
normal mechanisms, is liable under
international law for any direct loss,
damage, including environmental damage
and depletion of natural resources, or
injury to foreign governments, nationals
and corporations, as a result of Iraq's
unlawful Apvasion and occupation of
Kuwait; ...
Thus the Council explicitly included direct damage done to the
environment and the depletion of natural resources among the
injuries for which Iraq was to be held accountable under
international law. The Council then announced the creation of
a Fund (later to be named the United Nations Compensation
Fund) from which the payment of claims for the direct loss and
damage outlined in paragraph 16 was to be made.299 The
Council also announced that funds for payment of claims were
to come from Iraq based upon a percentage of the value of the
299
exports of its petroleum products. The Council concluded
by requiring the Secretary-General to provide recommendations
on the administering of the Fund, including a mechanism for
297 S.C. Res. 687, Apr. 3, 1991, (S/RES/687(1991)).
298 Id. at paragraph 19.
299 Id.
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determining an appropriate percentage of oil-related revenues.
The Secretary-General subsequently recommended that the
Fund be administered by a three-tiered Commission consisting
of: a policy-making Governing Council; a functional level
consisting of various commissioners expert in fields such as
finance, law and environmental damage assessment; and a
support level called the secretariat. With regard to the
functional aspects of processing claims, the Secretary-General
recommended that each nation should consolidate its own claims
along with the claims of its affected citizens and
corporations for presentation to the Commission.301  It was
further recommended that the Governing Council decide all
issues with one exception by a majority vote of at least nine
members.
302
The Security Council subsequently implemented the
Secretary-General's recommendations regarding the structure
for managing the Fund. It was left to the Governing Council
to recommend a mechanism for determining the percentage of
oil-related exports to be contributed by Iraq and to determine
. Secretary General's report of 2 May 1991, (S/22559)
at 2,3. (The Governing Council would be composed of one
representative from each of the current 15 members of the
Security Council at any given time. The Commissioners would
be nominated by the Secretary-General and appointed by the
Governing Council.)
301 Idi
302 I3. at 4. (The exception would be with regard to
the method of ensuring that payments are made to the Fund,
which would be decided by consensus.)
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the process for assessing and paying claims. The Security
Council also specified that if Iraq failed to make payments to
the Fund in accordance with the directions of the Governing
Council, then the prohibition on the importing of Iraqi
petroleum and petroleum products would be retained or
reimposed as the case may be.
4
c. Reparations for the Sea Island Terminal Spill and
Oil Well Fires
Having decided that Iraq is liable for "any direct loss,
damage, including environmental damage and depletion of
natural resources, or injury to foreign governments, nationals
and corporations..." caused as a result of the invasion,
305
the Security Council has explicitly included environmental and
natural resources costs such as those resulting from the Sea
Island Terminal oil spill and the Kuwaiti oil fires among
those which Iraq will be expected to pay as part of its
reparations. How much Iraq ultimately will have to pay is








S.C. Res. 687, para. 16, infra at 122.
306 Rowe, U.N. Studyina War-Damaae Assessment, Wash.
Post, May 14, 1991 at A12.
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Much will depend on the political will of key choke-point
states such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria through which
Iraqi oil pipelines travel, and the U.S., which largely
maintains the naval interdiction of Iraq's oil tanker route.
As long as these countries can threaten to cut-off Iraq's
access to oil markets, Iraq will have no choice but to accept
the U.N. reparations scheme. The amount Iraq will have to pay
for costs from the oil spill and oil well fires will also
depend on what costs the Fund's Governing Council interprets
as resulting from loss, damage, or injury arising from these
actions.
In order of decreasing connection, costs resulting from
the Sea Island Terminal oil spill and oil well fires can be
categorized as follows:
Clean-Up Costs:
The huge oil slick from Sea Island Terminal, mixed with
several other small spill sources, clogged approximately 335
miles of Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian beaches and coastal
307
marshes. About half of the oil from the original oil
308
spill is believed to have evaporated. Priority has gone
307 Kuwaiti Fire Health Risk Seen Lower Than Feared,
Wash. Post, June 11, 1991 at A10.
308 Efron, Kuwait's Oil Nightmare Slowly Abates, Wash.
Post, June 8, 1991 at A16.
From an environmentalist's viewpoint, to say that
the oil has evaporated does not mean that it has disappeared.
Since the world ecosystem is a closed system, the oil became
air pollution, which will in turn eventually return to again
pollute the land and water.
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to removing oil from the waters of the Gulf, to prevent its
fouling coastal areas farther south.309  While environmental
officials admit that much of the shoreline fouled by oil will
never be cleaned310, to the extent that such efforts are made,
costs in removing the oil from the Gulf and scrubbing the
shoreline are recoverable from the Fund. As of June, 1991,
between 3,000 and 6,000 barrels of oil continued to pour into
the Gulf each day from at least eight locations in Kuwait and
Iraq.311  The Commission will face the daunting task of
determining responsibility for the leaks in assessing recovery
costs to Iraq.
The extinguishing of Kuwait's oil well fires alone is
estimated to have cost $1.5 billion.312
Depletion of Natural Resources:
The oil well fires have been consuming up to 6 million
barrels of oil a day, an amount equal to a third of U.S. daily
309
Booth, War's Oil Spill Still Sullies Gulf Shore,
Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 1991 at A13.
As of June, 1991, 1.5 million barrels of oil had
been reclaimed from the Gulf, and an additional 2 million
barrels of oil/water mixture was removed and was awaiting
separation. This is the largest amount of oil ever recovered
from an oil spill. Efron, gu ra note 308 at A16.
310 Booth, supra note 309 at A13. (Oil washing up on
the beach has turned into asphalt in the baking sun. Flushing
marshes and mangrove stands has not even been attempted.)
311 Efron, s note 308.
312
Summary of World Broadcasts/The Morning Report,
British Broadcasting Corporation, Nov. 7, 1991, NEXIS,
currntfile: Kuwait oil well fires.
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oil consumption. At $20 a barrel market price, Kuwait is
losing $120 million a day in oil revenue. Additionally, the
uncontrolled fires have caused oil to be released from Kuwaiti
natural underground reservoirs at a rate that has caused
permanent damage to them. As a result, future Kuwait oil
production costs are likely to be higher and Kuwait's
estimated 100 year supply of oil may be reduced 10 to 20
years314 If this were not enough, Iraqi attempts to
sabotage 80 of the wells failed to ignite them but did succeed
in creating geysers of oil that have spread oil over thousands
of acres of desert.315  While killing plants, this oil is
also threatening to seep into desert aquifers, polluting an
316
important source of water in Kuwait. This damage would
have even longer term and more serious effects on Kuwait's
populace than the loss of oil income.
313 Arundel, EPA Chief Cites Kuwaiti Proqress Fiahtincr
Well Fires. Oil SDills, Wash. Post, June 5, 1991 at A28.
314 3 Booth, Kuwait's Oil Woes May Be Permanent. Wash.
Post, May 2, 1991 at Al. ( Oil is normally forced from the
Kuwaiti reservoirs by natural water pressure from surrounding
sandstone formations. The billowing white smoke from some
wells signals that the unusually high rate of extraction of
oil caused by the fires is causing water to seep into the
wells themselves and fouling them.)
But see Booth, su ra note 31 at A3. (U.S.
government scientists say that white smoke is not caused by
water seepage but something else. Environmental lobbying
groups have in turn charged government scientists with
downplaying the serious nature of the ecological damage.)
315 Pomfret, First Kuwaiti Well Capped: '799 To Go',
Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1991 at A26.
316 Booth, s note 234 at A12.
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The oil from the Sea Island Terminal spill which did not
evaporate or collect along the shores has sunk to the Gulf
floor where it may smother coral reefs and sea grass beds
which act as nurseries for shrimp, oysters and other fish.
317
The oil has also covered mud flats and salt marshes which also
provide fish nurseries and feeding grounds for migratory
birds. Scientists are concerned that the oil cover could
prevent birds from using them during their spring
318
migration. This damage will diminish the harvest of
valuable fish, shrimp and shellfish from the Gulf, causing
economic loss for Gulf fishermen in what was once a multi-
319
million dollar industry. The Commission will have a
challenging time estimating the loss in production
attributable to Iraq caused spills over many years.
Human Health Costs:
The oil spill into the Gulf and the potential polluting
of the aquifers both threaten the safety of Kuwait's water
supply. Since desalinization plants do not remove organic
materials such as crude oil from the water, it is passed along
320
to the consumer. Unfortunately, in order to kill harmful
bacteria, chlorine is also added. The result is the intake of
chlorinated hydrocarbons, a substance the U.S. considers
317 Infra note 11.
318 Booth, Su ra note 309 at A13.
319 3 Infra at pg. 6.
320 SORE, Dr. Alan Moghissi s note 192.
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carcinogenic and has spent heavily to reduce through the Super
321
Fund program.
Even if temperature inversions do not produce the feared
322
acute health problems, there remains concern about the
chronic health effects from breathing air polluted by the oil
well fires. Researchers are studying the tiny droplets of oil
falling over parts of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for the presence
of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), some of which are
323
known or suspected human carcinogens. The problem for the
Commission in assessing reparations for such chronic adverse
health effects is that it may take decades for the diseases to
manifest themselves. It is also often impossible to
distinguish cancer caused by oil well fires and oil spills
from that caused by normal petroleum processing operations or
even personal health habits such as smoking cigarettes. For
this reason, the Commission may decide the effects are too
indirect and speculative to be worth of compensation.
d. Issues Yet To Be Resolved
There are hundreds of details yet to be worked out
concerning the operation of the reparation fund. Among them
are two central issues which deserve attention early on.
321
322 3 Efron, supra note 308 at A16.
323 Booth, s note 234 at A12.
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1. Defining Direct Damage or Loss
The Governing Council will first have to provide guidance
on what it considers to be direct damage or loss arising from
the invasion of Kuwait. In the context of the oil spill and
oil well fires alone, this raises a host of questions. Will
clean-up costs such as those related to oil skimming and
wetlands restoration be included? May fishermen claim
compensation for the long-term losses they may suffer in
shrimp and fish harvests as a result of the damage done to the
sea grass bed nurseries? Can governments claim compensation
for the loss of wildlife within their territory and
territorial waters as a diminishment of the quality of life of
their citizens? Can Kuwait claim compensation for increased
chronic health risks associated with the increased air
pollution from burning oil wells when diseases may not
manifest themselves for decades and cannot be differentiated
from similar diseases caused by personal life choices and
other factors not related to the oil well fires? These are
potentially vast sources of liability for Iraq and the answers
given by the Governing Council will set an important precedent
for international environmental damage claims.
In answering these difficult questions, the Governing
Council should be influenced by certain limitations of
liability already in place in international environmental law
131
with regard to oil spills from tankers. These limitations are
contained in the International Convention on Civil Liability
324
for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1971 Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage.
325
A key provision in each of these conventions is that the
compensation provided covers only oil pollution damage
occurring on the territory or within the territorial sea of
324 3 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 0 [Hereinafter
Civil Liability Convention].
This Convention makes oil tanker owners strictly
liable for loss or damage from oil pollution including costs
related to minimizing further damage from spills. However,
owner liability is limited to 2,000 francs for each ton of the
ship's tonnage up to 210 million francs per vessel.
Nonetheless, oil spills caused by the fault or privity of the
owner have no such liability limitations. Further, an owner
may avoid all liability for a spill if he or she can show that
the pollution damage resulted from an act of war.
The Civil Liability Convention entered into force in
1975 and had 60 parties to it by May, 1989. Iraq is not a
party to the Convention.
325 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage,
1971 U.N.J.Y.B. 103 reprinted in International Environment
Reporter Reference File, at 21:1701 [Hereinafter International
Fund Convention].
This Convention provides supplemental compensation
to oil spill victims in the event payments under the Civil
Liability Convention prove inadequate to cover all damage
costs. Payments are made from a central fund into which oil
cargo-owners make mandatory contributions. There is a maximum
payment per incident of 450 million gold (Poincare') francs
inclusive of the amount already paid by the ship owner. The
Convention does not cover damage resulting from acts of war.
The International Fund Convention entered into
force in 1978 and as of June, 1989, there were 41 parties to
it. Iraq is not a party to the Convention.
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the parties. Thus, damage done on the high seas, to fish
stocks, shellfish or their nurseries for example, would not be
compensated for under the Conventions. Inasmuch as such
resources are located in a world "commons" area and therefore
are not owned by any nation, corporation or individual, this
limitation would be consistent with the Hague IV Regulations
and GC provisions which only prohibit destruction without
military necessity of property owned either publicly or
privately.
That international environmental law has not yet
developed to include liability for damage in world "commons"
areas is also evident from the failure of states to follow up
on the call in Article X of the London Dumping Convention
327
and Principle 21328 to take responsibility for pollution
damage caused in world commons areas such as the high seas.
In addition, there is also the practical difficulties involved
in assessing the value of lost wildlife and wildlife habitat
and determining the extent of their injury. Given the lack of
precedent for assessing liability for damage in commons areas,
the Governing Council is unlikely to compensate for damage
outside of the 12 mile territorial sea limits of the Gulf.
326 Civil Liability Convention, supra note 324 at
Art.II. International Fund Convention, Id. at Art. 3.
327 3 Discussed infra at note 144 and at page 37.
328 3 Infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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2. The Claims Process As Exclusive Remedy?
Also of tremendous significance is whether or not the
Governing Council should or even could make the Fund claims
process an exclusive remedy for victims seeking compensation
for damage done as a result of the invasion. With the growing
world trend in permitting civil suits in domestic courts
against foreign sovereigns for wrongs under domestic and even
international law, there is a danger that the Fund process
could be eclipsed by contradictory or duplicate decisions in
329
domestic courts. In his report, the Secretary-General was
329 Within the U.S., the opportunity for obtaining such
judgments in domestic courts was eliminated by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330 et. seq. in the case of
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 109 S.C.
683, 57 U.S.L.W. 4121, 28 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 382 (1989). The
Court held that Congress intended the FSIA to be the sole
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S.
federal and state courts. It then went on to review the
exceptions to immunity within the FSIA and concluded that none
applied to an attack by the armed forces of a foreign country
upon a neutral vessel outside the territorial waters of the
U.S.
An interesting argument might be made concerning
the qualifying language in FSIA sec. 1604 which makes immunity
from jurisdiction in U.S. courts "subject to existing
international agreements." The suggestion would be that GC
Art. 148 does not permit parties to absolve other parties from
liability for grave breaches and that the granting of immunity
from suit would do just that. However, the Court, responding
to similar arguments in the Amerada Hess case, noted
legislative history behind FSIA 1604 as requiring an express
conflict between the international agreement and immunity.
The Court seemed to require that the international agreement
must do more than just set forth substantive rules of conduct
and go on to create a private right of action. It also seemed
to require that the international agreement contain an
explicit waiver of immunity to suit in U.S. courts. GC Art.
148 falls short of these requirements. In addition, Art. 14C
134
of the opinion that the Security Council did not intend to
give the Commission exclusive competence to consider claims
330
arising from the invasion. Nonetheless, he did recommend
that the Governing Council establish guidelines and mechanisms
to ensure that the aggregate of compensation awarded by the
Commission and a national court does not exceed the amount of
the loss.3
1
The availability of other avenues to redress claims
against Iraq will depend on the domestic laws of the countries
to which the victims belong. In the U.S., for example, the
U.S. Congress could provide for an exception under the FSIA
which would allow for such suits in U.S. courts. The Congress
may also do what it has done following several other armed
conflicts, and establish a U.S. tribunal such as the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission for determining appropriate
compensation for U.S. citizens suffering losses from the war.
Claims could be paid from Iraqi assets frozen in the U.S. or
contemplated liability as established in claims made between
states only. See Pictet, supr note 257 at 603.
It is one thing for a state to agree to the
principle that it will not absolve itself or allow another
state to absolve it of responsibility for grave breaches. It
is another thing entirely to suggest that a state doing so
also is waiving its immunity from the jurisdiction of the
domestic courts of foreign governments, allowing them to
decide whether a breach occurred and setting the compensation
for it.






even from appropriated funds. Tribunals for resolving
claims could even be established in a bilateral agreement
between Iraq and individual nations.
Any plans for the U.S. to settle reparations with Iraq on
a bilateral basis or through litigation in U.S. domestic
courts would be met with a large amount of negative
international reaction. Already the subject of much suspicion
and envy, the U.S. would be perceived as grabbing all of the
spoils of the victory, leaving victims from other, less
powerful countries, to fend for themselves. In addition,
faced with the chaos of conflicting claims from dozens of
countries, and a break-up of the United Nations Coalition on
the issue, Iraq may refuse to pay any claims, leaving the
international community with no precedent at all for the
enforcement of international environmental law and the law of
armed conflict.
e. Conclusion Regarding the Reparations Option
Although there is an ample legal basis for insisting on
reparations for Iraq's violations of international law, some
critics argue against their use on political grounds. They
..nt to the example of World War I after which the victorious
332 33 For a discussion of the history of the foreign
claims process in the United States and its possible
application to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, see Glod, Preparin
the Bills for War's Devastation, Legal Times, Mar. 11, 1991 at
26.
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Allies saddled Germany with large reparation debts, thus
fueling German resentment and helping to bring on World War
333
II. There is no doubt that Iraq faces daunting economic
challenges as the result of the war. Already facing a pre-war
debt of approximately $80 billion , Iraq is now estimated
to need $100 billion to repair its own war damage.35 Iraq's
capacity to generate oil revenue was itself damaged in the
war, with one estimate suggesting a diminished output
336
resulting in annual oil income of only $17.5 billion. The
Security Council has also added to Iraq's international
financial obligations by voting to require it to pay the cost
of eliminating its arsenal of nuclear materials and chemical
and biological weapons at an estimated cost of $800
million.
Critics add that it would be unfair to punish an entire
nation for the acts of a dictator whom they did not
Hunter, Reparations Would Only Provoke Lust For
Revenge, L.A. Daily J., Mar. 26,1991 at 6.
Mufson, Iraa's Ability to Pay Reparations Doubted,
Wash. Post, Mar. 1. 1991 at A29.
335
Hunter, supra note 333.
336 Mufson, s note 334.
The U.N. Secretary-General has estimated that Iraq
will be able to earn $21 billion in gross oil receipts by
1993. See Goshko, U.S. Seeks Fast Payment From Iraa, Wash.
Post, June 4, 1991 at A10.
3 Smith, U.N. Tells Iraa to Pay Cost of Disarmament,
Wash. Post, June 18, 1991.
137
choose. Of course, the same argument could have been used
to justify no punishment for Germany and Japan for the horrors
committed by them against POWs and civilians during World War
II. In addition, to fail to hold nations responsible for
international law violations based on their form of government
would create a large class of judgment-proof nations with
aggressive dictatorships which would somehow be less
responsible for their international wrongs than other nations.
Given the number of non-democratic states at present, this
exception would easily swallow the rule.
The challenge will be to determine a percentage of oil-
based export revenue that will permit Iraq a modest
opportunity to rebuild and develop while offering victims
substantial if not complete compensation within a reasonably
short period of time. At the same time, it is important not
to muddle the reparations/economic sanctions mechanism in
geopolitics. The U.S. has taken the position that sanctions
against Iraq will remain in place as long as Saddam remains in
339
power. This position gives Iraq no incentive to begin
payments to the Fund. The U.S. is therefore risking losing an
important international law precedent and beneficial
compensation program to pursue a foreign policy goal it has
failed to achieve through even the extreme means of armed
conflict.
338
Hunter, supra note 333.
339
Goshko, pra note 336.
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Taking this dubious strategy one step further, a legal
theorist has argued for the imposition of punitive reparations
to remain in place until Saddam is overthrown.340 While such
a scheme is very attractive on an emotional level, there is
every indication from the events of the past year that the
present Iraqi government is firmly in power and will not be
dislodged short of armed foreign occupation of all of Iraq.
The reparations option is the most practical way to
affirm international environmental law and the law of armed
conflict. The Security Council has in place an historic
mechanism which can both compensate the victims of Iraq's
aggression and serve as a powerful precedent for applying
existing international law. Given the realities, the cause of
international law would best be served by achieving the
reasonable goal of obtaining reparations specifically
identified as compensation for Iraq's illegal activities.
Insisting upon more complex solutions of the legal issues or
attempting to combine difficult political goals risks the
substantial chance of ending up with no precedent at all.
XIII. Does International Law Need Further Development?
Even as the six week war was being waged against Iraq,
calls for new international laws to protect the environment
were being issued. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada
340
Green, supra note 274.
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called for consideration of an international conference of
legal experts to discuss "ways of strengthening international
law to prevent the environment from being used as a weapon of
war or an instrument of extortion". 341  Environmental
lobbying groups quickly followed. Greenpeace announced the
organization of a conference of lawyers and military experts
to discuss the elements of a "Fifth Geneva Convention... to
outlaw the use of the environment as a target of war".342
Even relatively obscure organizations proposed their own
frameworks for new treaties to protect the environment (e.g.
the Wildlife Information Center, Inc. proposed a Treaty on
343
Environmental Terrorism and Ecocide). The following
paragraphs discuss the merits of existing treaties attempting
to provide such protection and conclude with a discussion of
the utility of expanding the law of armed conflict further in
this area.
341 Speech by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada
(February 8, 1991).
342 New York Times, Mar. 11, 1991 at A9.
343
Press Release (Jan. 27, 1991) Wildlife Information
Center, Inc. ( Available from WIC: 629 Green St., Allentown,
PA 18102.) ( W.I.C. suggested that the deliberate
extermination or even endangerment of animal and plant species
and the deliberate creation of major oil spills for military
purposes should be prohibited.)
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A. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protect Vns of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts
The International Committee of the Red Cross presented
two draft Protocols to the widely adopted 1949 Geneva
Conventions at a diplomatic conference in 1974. These
Protocols were intended to update and expand the 1949 Geneva
Conventions in light of new weapons and tactics. They also
attempted to address problems which had developed in applying
the laws of armed conflict to hostilities during the post-
colonial period. Of concern in this paper is Protocol I,
which provides supplemental rules for both protecting non-
combatants and for limiting means and methods employed by
military forces during international armed conflicts.
Protocol I entered into force in 1978 and as of 1990 had 92
parties to it.
345
Negotiated over the course of four years in the mid-
1970's, the Protocol reflected the international antagonisms
which existed during this period between East and West (the
then existing Soviet Bloc and the western democracies) as well
344
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [Hereinafter Protocol I].
345
Kuwait became a party in 1985 although Iraq has
neither signed nor become a party to the Protocol. The
Byelorussian SSR and the U.S.S.R., China, Syria and Saudi
Arabia are parties. The U.S., Great Britain, France and the
German Federal Republic are not, although the U.S., the U.K.
and the G.F.R. have signed the Protocol.
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as between North and South (the industrialized, modern nations
and the struggling third world countries, many of which had
346
recently been granted independence). In many important
instance, the resulting Protocol resolved the differences
between the parties through use of ambiguous and unworkable
provisions and standards.347  Although the United States
signed Protocol I in 1977 during President Carter's
administration, as a result of these deficiencies, neither
President Reagan nor President Bush have chosen to submit the
Protocol to the Senate for ratification. Both the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department have recommended
348
against ratification. The fact that several other major
western military powers have refrained from ratifying Protocol
I is an indication that other states share U.S. concerns about
346 3 For an overview of the negotiating process involved,
see M. Bothe, K. Partsch and W. Solf, New Rules for Victims of
Armed Conflict: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 pp. 2-10 (1982)
[ Hereinafter cited as Bothe]. See also Schmidt, The
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts:
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 24 A.F.L.
Rev. 205-209 (1984). See also H. Levie, 3 Protection of War
Victims: Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 259-277.
347
See Roberts, The New Rules for Waginq War: The Case
Aaainst Ratification of Additional Protocol I, 26 Va. J. Int'l
L. 122-123, 166-170 (1985). See also Forsythe, Three Sessions
of Legislating Humanitarian Law: Forward March, Retreat. or
Parade Rest?, 11 Int'l L. 132-134 (1977). But see Aldrich,
Proaressive DeveloDment of the Laws of War: A Reply to
Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I 26 Va. J. Int'l L.
694 (1986).
348 3 See Geneva Convention Chanqe Questioned, Wash. Post,
July 23, 1985 at A3. See also Gelb, War Law Pact Faces
Objection of Joint Chiefs, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1985 at Al.
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its shortcomings.
Unfortunately, the provisions providing protection for
the environment were among those in the Protocol containing
vague and unworkable language. Two related provisions are
relevant. Article 35, paragraph 3 states: "It is prohibited
to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment. ,349 More expansive but
having essentially the same meaning is Article 55:
1. Care should be taken in warfare to
protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage.
This protection includes a prohibition of
the use of methods or means of warfare
which are intended or may be expected to
cause such damage to the natural
environment and thereby prejudice the
health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural
environment350by way of reprisals are
prohibited.
These parallel provisions reflect the different philosophical
approaches of the delegates drafting the Protocol over the
underlying reason for protecting the environment. The
language of Article 35:3, located in that portion of the
Protocol dealing with methods and means of warfare, represents
the concerns of those who felt that the protection of the
environment was an end in itself. Placed in the section
providing protections for civilians and civilian objects,
349
Protocol I, supra note 344 at Art. 35.
350
jd. at Art. 55.
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Article 55 emphasizes the conzerns of those delegates who saw
protecting the environment as a means of ensuring the survival
of civilians who were dependent upon it.
351
Although several provisions of the Protocol simply codify
existing customary law, the environmental protection
provisions are new law. Unlike the ENMOD Convention, which
only prohibits the deliberate use of the earth's natural
forces as a weapon against another party, Protocol I prohibits
Any mean or method employed in combat which results in
significant enough environmental damage to meet the
"widespread", "long-term" and "severe" tests. The prohibition
extends not only to methods or means of warfare which are
intende to cause significant damage to the environment, but
also to any means or method which "may be expected" to cause
such damage.
This is a considerable expansion of liability for
warriors attempting to carry out effective but lawful attacks
upon the enemy, and imposes an unfair burden upon them in
predicting the collateral effects of a given attack.
Submarine commanders launching torpedo attacks or surface
vessel commanders launching cruise missile attacks upon enemy
merchant vessels based upon over-the-horizon targeting would
risk having their actions labeled unlawful in the event the
merchantman turned out to be a bulk-oil or other hazardous
material carrier and the resulting spill caused significant
351 Bothe, s note 346 at 345.
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ecological damage in coastal areas.
Similarly unfair liability could be imposed upon attack
pilots or even ground crews providing rocket or artillery fire
support should they hit storage tanks containing hazardous
materials. If the resulting spill were to reach an aquifer
acting as the sole source of water for the area's population,
the environmental damage would be severe. It would be
unreasonable to require combatants to be this prescient and to
risk criminal or administrative sanction should their action
353
be labeled unlawful. An additional effect of such expanded
liability would be a potentially vast expansion of a
belligerent state's liability for environmental clean-up costs
engendered from attacks labeled unlawful under these
provisions.
At the heart of the ambiguity of the environmental
protection articles in Protocol I are the terms "widespread",
"long-term" and "severe" damage to the natural environment.
Remarkably, the terms are not defined in either the Convention
itself or in an attached Understanding thereto. While the
ENMOD Convention used almost the same terms (though in the
disjunctive rather than the conjunctive), the accompanying
352 Roberts, supra note 347 at 148.
353
Although violation of environmental prohibitions is
not listed as a grave breach in Protocol I and hence
prosecutable by any party to the Protocol, it may still be
considered a war crime by a victorious enemy or even one's own
armed force. 2= Protocol I, supra note 344 at Art. 85. See
also Schmidt, spra note 346 at 244.
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Understanding explicitly limited the use of the definitions
supplied to the ENMOD Convention itself.354  It is probably
telling that the report of the drafting committee working on
these Protocol I provisions indicated that while each term was
extensively discussed, it chose to explain only the term
"long-term".
The committee did go on to report that "it appeared to be
a widely shared assumption that battlefield damage incidental
to conventional warfare would not normally be proscribed by
this provision."'355  Additionally, the Chairman of the
committee sub-group which was responsible for the initial
approval of this language stated that "Acts of warfare which
cause short-term damage to the natural environment, such as
artillery bombardment, are not intended to be prohibited by
the Article."356 The sub-group Chairman went on to state that
the damage contemplated by the Articles must be such as to
disturb the stability of the ecosystem "for a significant
period of time perhaps for ten years or more. However, it was
impossible to say with certainty what period of time might be
354
ENMOD is discussed infra at 89. Article I of the
ENMOD convention prohibits "Use of environmental modification
techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe
effects..." See ENMOD Convention, supra note 225 at Art. I.
355
Bothe, supra note 346 at 346.
356. Report of the Chairman of the Group "Biotope",
Committee III, Mar. 11, 1975, CDDH/III/GT/35 reprinted in




Given the vagueness of the defining terms and the
uncertain nature of the underlying preparatory work on the
Protocol, it is not surprising that commentators have referred
to the environmental protection articles as having little
effect on military operations. One author opined that the
Articles are only hortatory, adopting only an unenforceable
goal of environmental protection.358  Taking a somewhat
similar approach, others have opined hopefully that the
Articles were "primarily directed to high level policy
decision makers", affecting only "unconventional means of
warfare such as the massive use of herbicides or chemical
agents."
359
Yet, if the Articles are only hortatory, why were the
terms "prohibit" and "prohibition" used? And if the purpose
was only to prevent national leaders from directing the use of
unconventional means of warfare, why doesn't the Protocol then
simply say that? Since all warfare can't help but damage the
environment to some extent, service men and women need to know
what level of environmental damage and through what means and
methods is it prohibited.
357
Id.
358 Almond, supr note 236 at 130.
359
Bothe, supra note 346 at 348. (The authors, who
were delegates from the United States and the Federal Republic
of Germany, concluded that the Articles would not impose any
significant limitation on combatants waging conventional
warfare.)
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The ambiguous nature of Protocol I's environmental
provisions has two potential effects. First, it leaves
military personnel vulnerable to prosecution or adverse
administrative action by authorities free to interpret the
terms as they see fit. Similarly, it leaves party states
vulnerable to propaganda and claims for compensation from
enemy states and their people based on a claim that the
Protocol was violated and the state was therefore legally
responsible.36 Second, given that nations at war are
already not inclined to impose legal limits upon themselves in
defeating an enemy, they will quickly ignore any such limit
which is not clearly defined. 36  Such treaty provisions do
not promote respect for or compliance with international law
and treaties containing such provisions are better left
unratified than agreed to only on paper and quickly
360
These consequences are all the more likely due to
the inclusion in Art. 55 of the prohibition against methods or
means of warfare which may be expected to cause widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.
The Rapporteur to the sub-group responsible for
this language observed that the term "may be expected" imports
an objective standard of what the state or individual does
realize or ought to realize would have the effects described.
See Report of the Third Committee on the Work of the Working
Group, Committee III, 3 April 1975, CDDH/III/275, XV, 357
reprinted in Levie, s note 346 at Vol. 3, 270. Inclusion
of an objective standard exposes service personnel and
belligerent states to liability at the broad discretion of the
trier of fact. This is perhaps acceptable in a civil tort
system, but it is unfair in the context of an armed conflict
in which the participants are at tremendous personal risk and
the national stakes are so high.
361 Almond, supxa note 236 at 130.
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forgotten. 362
B. Modifying the ENMOD Convention
The ENMOD Convention is unusual among public
international law treaties because of the inclusion of an
extensive battery of procedures it establishes for parties
wishing to engage in clarifying the objectives, applying the
Convention in a given circumstance or even amending the
Convention itself. It was as if the negotiating parties
themselves recognized that the Treaty as agreed upon could not
work, and would have to be changed. It may also be a
reflection of their recognition that they were attempting to
address a problem which had not yet manifested itself and
therefore the Convention needed special flexibility in further
362 3 In addition to the provisions discussed, Protocol I
also contains two further Articles, which while directed at
protecting civilian populations, also offer collateral
protection to the environment to the extent it would impact on
the population. Article 54 prohibits (with certain
exceptions) attacks upon or seizure of food and water supplies
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population for
the specific purpose of denying the population the use of
them. Protocol I, spra note 344 at Art. 54. Article 56
prohibits (with certain exceptions) attacks upon dams, dikes
and nuclear electrical generating stations when the attack may
result in severe losses among the civilian population.
Protocol I, supra note 344 at Art. 56.
Article 54 might arguably apply to the Sea Island
Terminal spill if viewed as targeting Saudi desalinization
plants. However, since this article is not reflective of
customary international law and Iraq is not a party to
Protocol I, it would not in any case apply.
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shaping itself in light of subsequent warfare.
The parties first agree to "...consult one another and to
co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation
to the objectives of, or in the application of..." the
Convention.364  In addition, any one party has the power to
require the Secretary-General of the U.N. (who acts as
depository for the Convention) to convene a Consultative
Committee of experts which is empowered to find facts or
provide expert views on any problem raised by the party.
365
Thirdly any party may propose an amendment to the Convention,
366
which will be circulated among all parties. The amendment
thereafter becomes binding upon acceptance of it by a majority
of existing parties. Finally, a majority of parties to the
Convention may call a conference to review operation of the
Convention "... with a view to ensuring that its purpose and
,,367provisions are being realized...
On the admittedly hopeful assumption that those states
which are parties to ENMOD are sincerely committed to giving
363 3 Recent Developments, Environmental Modification, 19
Harv. Int'l L. Rev. 389 (1978). But see Schafer, su ra note
247 at 311. (In which the author notes that the ENMOD
Convention was produced as a reaction to activities of the
U.S. during the Vietnam War and outlines U.S. use of cloud
seeding for tactical purposes.)
364 ENMOD Convention, supra note 226 at Art. V.(1).
365 Id. at Art. V(2) and Annex.
366 36 . at Art. VI.
367 36. at Art. VIII(2).
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effect to the treaty, the Iraqi oil release at Sea Island
Terminal and perhaps even the oil well fires offer an
excellent opportunity for clarifying what are the objectives
and application of the treaty. A modest proposal would be to
trigger the Consultative Committee of Experts provision. The
Committee could then make: 1) findings of fact concerning the
cause and extent of environmental damage involved in the oil
spill and oil well fires; 2) offer its expert view(s) on
whether these constitute environmental modification
techniques; 3) if so whether they had widespread, long-lasting
or severe effects; and 4) whether they served as a means of
destruction, damage or injury. The Committee's report could
then serve as a catalyst for any party seeking to amend the
Convention to either include or exclude this type of behavior
in armed conflict.
C. Can the Law of Armed Conflict Be Expanded Further to
Protect the Environment?
Past attempts to expand the international law of
armed conflict to include specific protections for the
environment have clearly failed. Given current realities,
further attempts for the foreseeable future will fail as well.
That is because states are not yet willing to make the
necessary commitment to reduce trans-boundary pollution.
That lack of commitment is reflected in the current
woefully underdeveloped state of international environmental
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law. Despite 40 years of developing treaties to restrict
marine pollution, the global states have not even attempted to
address the source of two-thirds of all marine pollution,
368
which is land sources. At the same time, with the
exception of CFCs, there has of yet been no attempt to place
international emissions restrictions on air pollution. If
nations are not willing to restrict their conduct with regard
to pollution during times of peace, how can it reasonably be
expected that they will be willing to do so when they are at
war?
When nations are at war they are unlikely to be receptive
to follow restrictions on their conduct imposed by the
international legal system. Vital national interests and the
369
very lives of their citizens are at risk. In Vietnam, the
U.S. chose to trade the significant environmental consequences
caused by the massive use of fire power for fewer U.S. combat
casualties.370  Is there any doubt that given that choice
3 Some effort has been made in the U.N. Regional Seas
treaty program to include land sources, but is unclear whether
the states involved are able or willing to actually enforce
these restrictions.
369 Almond, supra note 236 at 131,136.
P. Rowe, Defense- The Leaal Implications 116 (1987).
(The author noted that massive firepower was used to clear the
ground instead of using troops who would be susceptible to
booby traps, ambushes and sniper fire. The U.S. used a number
of weapons to do this. The "Daisycutter bomb cleared fire-
base helicopter landing areas but also deforested a quarter of
a mile radius of land. Chemical herbicides and armored
bulldozers called Rome Plows were also used to clear away
vegetation.)
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again we would do things differently?
In addition, despite the almost universal membership
among nations to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, actual
observance of the provisions during armed conflicts over the
past 40 years has been the exception not the rule. Since
states are apparently not yet committed to carrying out
provisions designed to prevent unnecessary human suffering,
why should it be expected that restrictions designed to
prevent environmental suffering will be followed?
Time and energy would be more productively be spent
attempting to fashion agreements among nations on the
fundamental peacetime issues of population control and
consumption control which both drive the global pollution
problem.
XIV. Conclusion
Saddam Hussein and his government are so starkly,
brutally evil that it is easy to become fixated on fashioning
international prohibitions and remedies for his excesses
without also considering how they will apply in other
contexts. For example, applying Principle 21's extension of
liability for damage in commons areas would open up most
nations, including the U.S., to liability those nations could
not possibly accept politically let alone financially.
A more realistic and ultimately more helpful approach to
the development of international law would be if we recognize
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that many nations are responsible for trans-boundary
pollution. Despite the London Dumping Convention's call for
developing procedures to assess liability and settle disputes
arising out of ocean dumping, nothing has been done. What
should be avoided in responding to Iraq's excesses is holding
it to a standard in wartime which the rest of the world
community is unwilling to live by even in peacetime.
As the world community justly calls Iraq to task for its
violations of international law (including crimes against
peace and war crimes), some inclusion of the environmental
damage is nonetheless appropriate. Those Gulf states which
have had their environment damaged should seek some reasonable
amount of reparations tied to an explicit acknowledgement by
Iraq that it violated the international laws suggested by this
paper. Using the Civil Liability Convention and the
International Fund Convention as a guide for the extent of
Iraqi liability, the affected states should demand
compensation only for damage and containment efforts involving
their territory and territorial seas.
Whatever reparations are decided upon by the Commission,
they will form an important precedent for both international
environmental law and the law of armed conflict. Establishing
this precedent will form a basis for the further reasonable
development of international law as a whole. Pressing a too
ambitious remedy risks the result of having no precedent at
all.
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